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 1 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this project is to explain what factors account for the differentials in 
treatment of Bosnian refugees in Sweden and Germany. Although both of these 
states are signatories of the same international conventions that govern states’ 
humanitarian obligations toward refugees, the resources available to the refugees 
varied greatly between both countries, which in turn influenced the lived 
experiences of the Bosnian refugees. This paper examines these discrepancies 
within the contexts of ideas about national citizenship, the existence of 
governmental institutions designed to foster refugee integration, and external, non-
state factors such as the media and other charitable organizations that were capable 
of impacting refugee experiences. My research was primarily conducted through an 
examination of academic sources, including books, journal articles, and scholarly 
studies. I also relied heavily upon individual interviews conducted by academic 
researchers as well as primary source documents from both the Swedish and 
German governments. My research revealed in full form the true complexity of the 
reasons for the discrepancies and discontinuities in the treatment of Bosnian 
refugees. The distinctive political and social histories of Sweden and Germany 
provided yet another rich and complicated dimension to my project. Although my 
capstone is centered on two specific case studies, the lessons learned from them are 
invaluable when discussing the wider implications of incorporating humanitarian 
standards in international laws and agreements. 
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Executive Summary 
 
The breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 plunged the Balkan Peninsula into a 
bloody and genocidal war for much of the last decade of the 20th century. Some of 
the worst atrocities of the war were perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a 
multiethnic area of the former Yugoslavia inhabited by Bosnian Serbs (31.2% of 
population), Bosnian Croats (17.4%), and Muslim Bosniaks (43.5%), as well as 
multiple other groups. Throughout this tumultuous period, self-interested political 
figures such as the Serbian nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic were able to 
manipulate issues surrounding ethnicity for their own political gains, which resulted 
in a years-long war marked by horrors such as “ethnic cleansing” and mass rape. 
The brutality of the war, especially in Bosnian-Herzegovina, prompted millions of 
Bosnians to flee their homeland in search of refuge in central, northern, and western 
European countries. Germany and Sweden, respectively took in the largest number 
of refugees throughout the war years. 
In the wake of the disastrous World Wars of the 20th century, many 
countries, including Germany and Sweden, signed on to international agreements 
pertaining to the treatment of refugees in the hopes of preventing large-scale 
humanitarian catastrophes from occurring in the future. These agreements included 
the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the Geneva Convention, and the 
1967 Protocol. In addition to bringing the plight of refugees to the forefront of the 
international conscience, these agreements helped to establish universally observed 
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standards in order to ensure that all refugees were entitled to the same basic rights, 
including the right to seek asylum when faced with persecution in their homelands.  
Theoretically, these international agreements should have established 
overarching guidelines around which governments could have crafted their own 
nation’s policies regarding the treatment of refugees. However, it is clear that this is 
not the case amongst the signatory countries, most notably in Sweden and Germany 
during the height of the Bosnian War. This difference thus prompts a tension, even a 
paradox, which is the main subject of this study: If all countries who are party to the 
aforementioned agreements are obligated to follow the same standards of refugee 
treatment, then what accounts for the vastly different refugee experiences with 
regards to integration and inclusivism in Sweden and Germany?  
My research has revealed that there are many complex reasons as to why 
refugees had different experiences in Sweden and Germany. In addition to 
differences in codified citizenship laws, the ability/willingness of government 
institutions to provide resources for refugees, and the influence of non-state 
organizations such as the media and charitable groups, the differentials in treatment 
of refugees can also be explained by the unique political and social histories of 
Germany and Sweden as well as by specific national goals and priorities. To add 
another dimension of complexity, my research also suggests that the lived 
experiences of Bosnian refugees were not necessarily contingent upon 
institutionalized and governmental support systems. Rather, refugees who reported 
feeling satisfied with their new lives cited the support they received from their local 
communities and the public at large as a key part of their integrative experience. 
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Although my capstone is centered on two specific case studies, the lessons learned 
from them are invaluable when discussing the wider implications of incorporating 
humanitarian standards in international laws and agreements. 
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 7 
Introduction 
 
 The breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 plunged the Balkan Peninsula into a 
bloody and genocidal war for much of the last decade of the 20th century. Some of 
the worst atrocities of the war were perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a 
multiethnic area of the former Yugoslavia inhabited by Bosnian Serbs (31.2% of 
population), Bosnian Croats (17.4%), and Muslim Bosniaks (43.5%), as well as 
multiple other groups. After the Muslim and Croat majority population held a 
referendum in 1992 declaring its independence, the Bosnian Serb population, 
supported by Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic, mobilized its troops inside 
Bosnian territory in order to secure Serbian territorial strongholds. War soon 
spread throughout the entire country, and was marked by horrors such as ethnic 
cleansing and the systematic rape of tens of thousands of mostly Bosniak women. It 
is currently estimated that up to 100,000 people were killed in the Bosnian War, and 
up to 2.2 million were displaced.1 Such levels of devastation had not been seen on 
the European continent since World War II.  
 Although the fighting was largely confined to the Balkan Peninsula, the 
intensity of the war caused hundreds of thousands of Bosnian refugees to pour into 
central and northern Europe to escape persecution. While virtually every European 
country opened their borders to these refugees, this paper will focus specifically on 
Bosnian refugees in Germany and Sweden, which received the greatest numbers of 
1 William S Walker, German and Bosnian Voices in Times of Crisis, (Indianapolis: Dog 
Ear Publishing, 2010), 2. 
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displaced people, respectively. As of June of 1996, the year after the Bosnian War 
officially concluded, there were 345,000 displaced Bosnians living in Germany. 
Today, fewer than 10,000 of these refugees remain in Germany. Between 1991 and 
1996, Sweden welcomed nearly 80,000 Bosnians into the country; over 56,000 
remain there.  
 Many European states, including Germany and Sweden, shape the framework 
for their national refugee policies based on the tenets of various international 
agreements, such as the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions, the 1967 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the UNCHR 1992 mandate. Theoretically, 
such a similar basis for constructing national refugee policy should yield similar 
results as to how individual UN member states receive and treat their refugee 
populations. This does not hold true when examining the policies of Germany and 
Sweden during the Bosnian War, since these two countries approached and handled 
the “Bosnian refugee crisis” very differently. If all UN member states follow and 
accept the same international laws and conventions regarding refugees, then what 
accounts for the differentials in how the Swedish and German governments treated 
displaced Bosnians? In this paper I examine possible historically and legally 
informed differences between Sweden and Germany that could account for these 
discrepancies. I ask the following questions: What are the national attitudes 
regarding citizenship and who should possess it? What kinds of national 
institutions, or lack thereof, are there to help facilitate refugee social incorporation? 
How did media representations of Bosnian refugees influence their experiences in 
these countries?  
 9 
While there are almost certainly myriad factors that contributed to national 
refugee policy making and refugee experiences, this paper will focus on examining 
the proposed discrepancy within the boundaries of these questions. These three 
domains – citizenship, national institutions, and media – serve as clear points of 
comparison for Germany and Sweden, as nation’s citizenship policies, the 
expansiveness of institutions that foster integration, and media construction of 
social reality and public sentiment are often reflective of specific national histories 
and state attitudes toward issues surrounding immigration and inclusivism. I will 
now turn to these complicated and converging historical, legal and media forces, 
practices, and processes.  
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Chapter 1: Background and the Bosnian War 
 
 
 Perhaps the most popular stance on the cause of the war in the Balkans was 
that it was a war fueled by ethnic tensions. When the map of Europe was redrawn 
following the post World War I breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was 
decided to make a state specifically for the Southern Slavs – hence the name 
‘Yugoslavia.’ Convention holds that the root of the most recent conflict in the 1990s 
was due in large part to Serbian aggression and to the inability of the Yugoslavian 
government to control tensions between ethnic Serbians, Croats, and Bosnian 
Muslims (Bosniaks) – that it was only a matter of time before ethnic tensions boiled 
over and culminated in a brutal war.2  
 While ethnic hatred certainly played a role in the Bosnian War, there are 
other theories that maintain that the causes of the war were much more complex.  
Susan Woodward asserts in her book Balkan Tragedy that the war in Bosnia was 
anything but inevitable. Prior to Yugoslavia’s “rapid disintegration,” the “relative 
prosperity, freedom to travel and work abroad, and landscape of multicultural 
pluralism that Yugoslavs enjoyed were the envy of eastern Europeans.”3 Despite this 
optimism for the future and positive outlook toward multiculturalism, Yugoslavia 
completely unraveled and was plunged into conflict within three years of the fall of 
the Berlin Wall. Instead of ascribing to the conventional school of thought that the 
war was caused solely due to ethnic tensions, Woodward discusses the crisis in the 
Balkans in the context of the larger international political framework by placing it as 
2 Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, 
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 3. 
3 Ibid, 1.  
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just one piece of “a more widespread phenomenon of political disintegration” in the 
immediate post-Cold War order.4 In addition, Woodward also places some 
responsibility for the conflict at the feet of big powers, including the United States 
and many of the nations of Western and Central Europe. She claims that these 
nations had a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict in Bosnia, 
and were thus ill equipped and ill prepared to address it accordingly.5 One camp 
(composed of the U.S. and Germany) held that the war was mainly a product of 
Milosevic-led Serbian aggression, while the other (composed of Western and 
Northern European countries) believed it was “a civil war based on the revival of 
ethnic tensions after the fall of communism” with responsibility belonging to both 
Croats and Serbs.6 Different views on the origins of the war ultimately led to 
disagreements on how to address it, thus prolonging the development of an effective 
plan of action. The United States and its supporters were mainly concerned with 
preserving the international order and stability; they opposed the breakup of 
Yugoslavia and recognizing the new territorial partitions.7 However, countries such 
as Britain and France were more worried about what the implications of the 
Bosnian War were in more concrete terms: refugee flows.8  
 Woodward also suggests that nationalist leaders, such as Serbia’s Slobodan 
Milosevic and Croatia’ Franjo Tudjman were responsible for artificially creating an 
environment that allowed for ethnic tensions to take the political center stage. By 
4 Ibid, 3. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid, 7. 
7 Ibid, 8.  
8 Ibid, 9. 
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doing so, these leaders were able to manipulate feelings of nationalism and ethnic 
pride in order to achieve their own political goals. This deliberate change in policy 
was evident before the war in Bosnian even began. In April 1987, the “Serbian part 
shifted tactics by adopting the increasingly nationalist language of critical 
intellectuals and issues of popular protest within the republic.”9 Milosevic was able 
to effectively mobilize feelings of Serbian nationalism and superiority by “playing 
directly and personally to the crowd.”10 V.P. Gagnon’s book The Myth of Ethnic War 
supports this theory. Gagnon claims that elites like Milosevic instituted this strategy 
with the goal of “silencing, marginalizing, and demobilizing” those who challenged 
their political power.11  Thus, Gagnon asserts, “the wars and violence seen in the 
1990s were thus not the expression of grassroots sentiments in the sites of conflict. 
Rather, violence was imposed on plural communities from outside those 
communities…as a part of a broader strategy of demobilization.”12  
 The results of this policy were most clearly seen in the region of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Bosnia has been a “multi-ethnic crossroads” of the Serb and Croat 
identities for centuries, as well as a political and religious battleground.13 By the 
middle of the sixteenth century, nearly half of Bosnians had converted to Islam, due 
to the influence of the occupying Ottoman Empire.14 Because of Bosnia’s history as a 
religious and ethnic crossroads, leaders like Milosevic were able to exacerbate 
9 Ibid, 90. 
10 Ibid, 91. 
11V.P. Gagnon, Jr. The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2004), xv.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 29. 
14 Ibid, 32. 
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tensions in this region when Yugoslavia was in the process of breaking up in 1990-
91. Many Muslims and Croats in Bosnia, as well as Croats living in the country now 
known as Croatia, interpreted Milosevic’s attitude regarding Serbian expansion as 
quite dangerous; many began to fear for their survival as ethnic groups and for the 
survival of the state. Tensions came to a head in Bosnia because Bosnian Muslims 
and Bosnian Croats did not want to live in a Milosevic-led, Serb dominated 
Yugoslavian state. Concurrently, Bosnian Serbs did not want to become part of what 
they perceived would become “Muslim Bosnia” and lose ties with Milosevic’s pro-
Serbia government.15  
 When the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, who composed forty-four and 
seventeen percent of Bosnia’s population respectively, voted in favor of an 
independence referendum in February 1992 the Bosnian Serbs in Parliament 
refused to accept this outcome.16 Despite this internal refusal of recognition and 
promises of boycott from Bosnian Serbs, independence was officially declared on 
March 3, 1992. International recognition of independence came in early April of the 
same year; the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina officially joined the United 
Nations as its own entity in May 1992.17 Keeping with their promises, the Serbian 
breakaway group of the Bosnian Parliament, known as the “Assembly of the Serb 
People of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” adopted a declaration in January 1992, which 
proclaimed the existence of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.18 This 
15 Ibid, 40. 
16 Ibid. 
17 United Nations, "United Nations Member States." 
http://www.un.org/en/members/. 
18 Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 61. 
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Assembly proceeded to endorse the idea of creating a separate Serbian state in 
areas with Serbian ethnic majorities within the state of Bosnia. It was written into 
the Constitution of the new Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that its 
borders would include “the territories of the Serbian Autonomous Regions and 
Districts and of other Serbian ethnic entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including 
the regions in which the Serbian people remained in the minority due to the 
genocide conducted against it in World War II."19 The Serbian Republic then 
changed its name to the Republika Srpska. In response to these threatening shows 
of Serbnationalism, the Bosnian Croat community, with the support of the ruling 
party led by President Tudjman in Croatia, came together to form the Croatian 
Community of Herzeg-Bosnia.20 By the middle of 1992, it was clear that Bosnia 
would serve as the platform on which these politically manipulated ethnic tensions 
would play out. The proverbial lines in the sand had been drawn between Serbian 
and Croatian nationalist leaders. However, the group who arguably had the most to 
lose was Bosnia’s Muslim (Bosniak) majority population who had gotten firmly 
stuck in the middle. 
 The war in Bosnia was partially driven due to the ideas Serb and Croat 
nationalist leaders held about territory possession. Convention held that wherever 
there was a Serb, then that land was a part of Serbia; wherever there was a Croat, 
that land was a part of Croatia.21 Muslims did not fit into this equation. Given that 
both Serbs and Croats (and Muslims) lived in Bosnia, given these conflicting ideas 
19 "Constitution of Republika Srpska." 
http://www.vijecenarodars.net/materijali/constitution.pdf. 
20 Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 62. 
21 Ibid, 45. 
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and claims about nations and “their” territory, it became a fairly obvious place for a 
conflict to break out.22 Serbia framed their war against Croatia using language that 
harkened back to World War II; Milosevic sought to portray Croatia as the 
aggressor, and that Serbia was fighting against “Greater Germany pile driving its 
way to the Adriatic with the help of wartime allies.”23 Although Serbia viewed itself 
as on the defensive against an aggressor, Bosnian Muslims who were on the 
reciprocal end of wartime atrocities viewed Serbia’s “psychodramatic revenge as 
not being wreaked upon stronger Croatian opponents, but on the one people Serbs 
knew they could cut through like a knife in butter – unarmed Muslims.”24 Of the 407 
camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina investigated by the UN Commission of Experts in the 
later years of the war, nearly two-thirds of them were run by Serbs.25 The 
committee found that “while no wrong doing could be identified in the detention 
camps operated by Croats or Bosnian Muslims, the Serbian camps were instruments 
of state policy of ‘ethnic purification’ through terror and genocide.”26 According to 
Cohen, the Serbian camps were reminiscent of the Nazi camps of a half-century 
earlier, in that the war crimes perpetrated in them were “systemically and centrally 
orchestrated.”27 
22 Ibid, 42. 
23 Ibid, 43. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Philip J. Cohen, “The Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals in the Genocide in the 
1990s,” in This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia, ed. Thomas 
Cushman and Stjepan G. Mestrovic (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 
52. 
26 Cohen, “Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals,” 53. 
27 Ibid, 53. 
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 Despite the fact that this war was driven by the political machinations of a 
few elites, the leaders were successfully able to cause language of ethnic hatred to 
permeate the population. For example, a large portion of Serbian vitriol was 
directed toward Muslim Bosniaks. While the “Croats drove a mixture of fear, hatred, 
and respect into the Serbs,” Muslims were another matter entirely.28 Researcher 
and journalist Ed Vulliamy, who conducted fieldwork and interviews behind the 
frontlines of the Serbian army, reported that Serb soldiers regularly referred to 
Muslims as “gypsies, filth, and animals.”29 To further dehumanize Muslim Bosniaks, 
the Republika Srpska greatly exaggerated the threat of an Islamic jihad in 
southeastern Europe. What is particularly ironic about this claim is that before the 
war, Bosnian Muslims were not particularly observant. Prior to 1992, and due to the 
combined effects of socialist ideologies and local traditional practices, mosque 
attendance in Bosnia was at approximately three percent.30 In response to wartime 
time religious persecution, however, pockets of more radical and rigorous Islam 
popped up throughout Bosnia. The war even attracted Arab fighters from the Middle 
East, which in turn sped up the radicalization process of some young Bosnian 
fighters.31 Radicalized youths and Arab fighters joined together to form the Muslim 
Armed Forces. However, this group was widely loathed by the majority of Bosnians 
28 Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, 46. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Tone Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 205. 
31 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 356-357. 
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and the mainstream Bosniak army, as it tried to force ideas of Islamic 
fundamentalism on what was a largely secular population.32  
 Prior to the war, many Bosniaks had not framed their identities around being 
a Muslim; rather, many youths considered themselves to be products of Yugoslav 
and western European culture. According to Vulliamy’s research, youths were all 
but forced to adopt a new perspective, if only for the sake of survival. One young 
man relayed to Vulliamy that he “never thought of himself as a [religious] Muslim. 
He didn’t know how to pray, and he never went to mosque.” Despite this, the war 
and persecution had caused him to view himself in a new, unwanted light. He had 
been all but forced to think of himself as a part of the Muslim people, because he 
“had to understand what it was about him and his people that they wished to 
obliterate.”33 The community in which hundreds of thousands of Bosniaks had lived 
for centuries had suddenly become extremely hostile toward them. 
 “Ethnic cleansing” was the next step in the hostilities directed against 
Bosnian Muslims following the carving up of territory by the Republika Srpska. In 
1992, Serbian General Mladic led his army across eastern Bosnia like “a grim 
combine harvester,” displacing and sometimes killing nearly 104,000 Muslims.34 
During this early stage of the war, Muslims tried to join forces informally to defend 
their towns from the Serbian army. They were chased away by a band Bosnian-Serb 
civilians bent on carrying out the army’s mission; they fittingly called themselves 
the “Serbian Volunteer Army.” In order to aid the Republika Srpska Army with the 
32 Bringa, Being Muslim, 232. 
33 Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, 42. 
34 Ibid, 88. 
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“cleansing” process, the group would first march into a Muslim town to “wreak the 
first rounds of horror” by setting fires and throwing grenades. The army would 
follow to remove and transport remaining civilians to transit camps; the death 
squads came in the last wave to ‘mop up’ those who had resisted.35 
 In the early stages of the war, the most ferocious ethnic cleansing occurred in 
the towns that the Republika Srpska had declared to be under the jurisdiction of the 
autonomous ‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ Between 150 and 200 
homes, mosques, and Muslim businesses were being burned per day, creating a 
steady flow of refugees to Croatia. The UNCHR called this “the most serious refugee 
crisis since the Second World War.”36 At this point, the true extent of the ethnic 
cleansing program and Serbia’s plan to exterminate Bosnia’s Muslim population was 
not well known to the rest of the world. Stories of the horrific, genocidal treatment 
of Muslims were beginning to trickle out of Bosnia with the refugees who had fled to 
Croatia.37 Unbeknownst to the United States and the nations of western and 
northern Europe, the worst was yet to come. 
 The stories that have emerged from the concentration camps in western 
Bosnia can be thought of as modern iterations of those that have been passed down 
as part of the horrific legacy of World War II. Unlike World War II, however, the 
existence of these camps was known to the west. The Serbian Army preferred to call 
these camps, like Omarska and Trnopolje, ‘investigation centers.’38 Although Serbian 
35 Ibid. 
36 Jeanne Haskin, Bosnia and Beyond: The "Quiet" Revolution That Wouldn't Go 
Quietly, (New York: Algora Publishing, 2006), 74. 
37 Haskin, Bosnia and Beyond, 76. 
38 Ibid, 103. 
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officials widely proclaimed to journalists that the camps served as holding and 
investigation centers for men accused of being members of the Government Army, 
the accounts of the prisoners reveal a much more grim and inhumane reality. 
Although Serbian army officers and government officials attempted to maintain a 
semblance of transparency by allowing western journalists, like Ed Vulliamy, into 
the camps, they were only able to view select areas. For instance, Vulliamy and his 
colleagues were not permitted to see buildings where civilian prisoners were 
reportedly being held. It is now known that Omarska and other camps were places 
of “savage killing, torture, humiliation, and barbarous cruelty.”39 The Muslims and 
Croats in the camps were often deprived of food and water for days on end, were 
randomly selected for beatings and executions, and were subsequently forced to 
clean up the blood of their fellow prisoners following nights of mass murder.40 
 Although the west was able to forge an agreement with Serbia to close some 
of the camps, some, such as Trnopolje, remained open for months after the mutually 
agreed international deadline mainly due to two factors. First, other European 
countries refused or were unable to take in a sufficient number of Muslim and Croat 
refugees. There was essentially no where for the prisoners to go; not all of the 
hundreds of thousands who had been encamped were able to start their lives anew 
in Western Europe. Returning home was out of the question for most. The 
conditions in eastern Bosnian communities in the Podrinje region were still 
incredibly hostile to former Muslim residents. Those who did attempt to return once 
the camps were ‘opened’ and prisoners were ‘free to go’ were often murdered on 
39 Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, 110. 
40 Ibid, 110. 
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the spot by Serbs who had taken over the town. Others found that all their 
belongings had been looted, or that their homes had been destroyed or were being 
occupied by Bosnian Serb civilians.41 The Muslims and Croats who had not been 
rounded up for the camps were also desperate to leave Bosnia and the murderous 
Serbian regime. Organizations such as the Red Cross were simply not equipped to 
find places abroad for all prisoners and refugees during the early years of the war. 
By the end of 1992, a United States Senate investigative report concluded that 
Muslims had been ‘cleansed’ from nearly seventy percent of Bosnia.42 
 By the summer of 1992, 1.8 million Bosnians had been “driven from their 
homes, killed or gone missing; those alive were on the move…the biggest forced 
movement of people in Europe since the Reich.”43 More than half of these displaced 
persons remained in Bosnia; nearly 350,000 others had been taken in as refugees by 
Croatia.44 The Croatian government claimed that it was at its breaking point, and 
could not logistically accept any more refugees. It appealed to other, wealthier 
European nations to help take some of the burden. While Croatia would continue to 
offer transit visas to help Bosnian refugees get to their final destination, it was no 
longer able to offer refugees places to stay.45 As a result of this, a handful of 
European countries hesitantly opened their doors to refugees.  
By mid-August of 1992, Germany reported legally receiving 135,000 
refugees, and admitted that another 65,000 were in the country illegally. Hungary 
41 Ibid, 114. 
42 Bringa, Being Muslim, 225. 
43 Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, 125. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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accepted 54,000, but then announced that its borders were closed. Austria took 
50,000, and Sweden took 44,000. Other Western Europeans managed to take in a 
few thousand refugees each, while Turkey only managed to accept 7,000 of their 
“desperate co-religionists.”46 The discovery of the horrors taking place in the 
‘reception’ and ‘investigative centers’ further complicated the issue, as Serbia 
offered to free their prisoners if international agencies would take on the 
responsibility of finding them somewhere to go. This forced the UNCHR to either 
“condemn the inmates to further detention” in horribly inhumane conditions or to 
“facilitate the Serbian goal of ethnic cleansing” by removing the prisoners from 
Serbian territory.47 
 After three years of ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, mass rape, and 
over 100,000 deaths, the war in Bosnia concluded in December 1995 with the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. Not only did these atrocities permanently alter 
the geopolitical landscape of Bosnia, but they were also the root causes of the largest 
European refugee crisis in the second half of the twentieth century. Hundreds of 
thousands of asylum seeking refugees streamed out of the Balkan Peninsula, and 
into Central, Northern, and Western Europe. As of June 1996, Germany and Sweden 
respectively had the largest populations of Bosnian refugees. Germany’s number 
had increased from 135,000 in 1992 to 345,000; Sweden’s had increased from 
44,000 to 122,000.48 Although the war had officially ended, Bosnia was still a 
46 Ibid, 157. 
47 Ibid, 158. 
48 Simon Bagshaw, "Benchmarks or Deutschmarks? Determining the Criteria for the 
Repatriation of Refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina," International Journal of 
Refugees, 9, no. 4 (1997): 566. 
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volatile place that was not safe for all of the refugees to return. This left Germany 
and Sweden with a critical question – what was the best way to address the refugee 
crisis, both in the short and long term?   
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Chapter 2: International Refugee Law 
 
 
 The Bosnian War created a security and refugee crisis on a scale unseen in 
Europe since World War II. Not only did this war forever alter the population 
landscape of the former Yugoslavia, but it also placed pressures on many of the 
surrounding countries to help ease the burden of refugee flows, including Germany 
and Sweden. International refugee law and especially who can legally qualify as a 
refugee has been a relatively fluid subject of debate since the early twentieth 
century and the interwar period. In addition to this, many countries have an ongoing 
internal debate regarding what status and rights refugees should have once they 
have been resettled. Theoretically, these states have similar frameworks for 
accepting refugees, which are based on adopted international laws such as the 1951 
Convention on the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Convention (the New York 
Protocol), and the UNHR 1992 Mandate.49  Before examining what accounts for the 
differences in Germany and Sweden’s refugee policies, it is first necessary to explore 
the similarities and foundational backbones of the conventions that have driven 
policy adoption.  
 At the conclusion of World War II, Europe was faced with the problem of how 
to organize the return of the millions of people that had been displaced or deported 
from their native countries due to wartime atrocities. While the Allies had set up 
temporary organizations such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
49 While the status quo of international refugee law has been shaped by many 
different organizations over numerous decades and is the result of countless 
international agreements, this chapter will be focusing on the three agreements that 
are the most relevant in terms of German and Swedish policies toward Bosnian 
refugees. 
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Administration, marginal efforts were unable in either scale or jurisdiction to 
sufficiently address the scope of the refugee issue. It was clear that the international 
community was in need of a more permanent and collaborative organization to lead 
the way in assisting current and future refugee populations.50 The International 
Refugee Organization was born in 1947, “as a specialized agency of the United 
Nations to deal with the residual problem of refugees.”51 Its main objective was the 
resettlement of refugee populations, and it was the first organization to 
comprehensively address “every aspect of refugee problems: registration, 
determination of status, repatriation, resettlement, and legal and political 
protection.”52 However, the IRO’s activities were short-lived; its operations ceased 
in 1951 due to lack of support from some states in the UN community. The 
organization came under fire by states that did not support resettlement as a 
strategy for dealing with refugees. The IRO was also severely underfunded due to 
this lack of unanimous support, as it was funded by only eighteen of the fifty-four 
member states.53 
 Thus far, international organizations had been unsuccessful in establishing 
permanent protocols and organizations designed to help refugees. The Cold War 
political divisions that descended across the globe made coming to an international 
agreement all the more difficult. However, it was also realized that international 
action and cooperation were needed to successfully address the issues that current 
50 Karen Musalo , Jennifer Moore, and Richard Boswell, Refugee Law and Policy: A 
Comparative and International Approach , (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 
22. 
51 Ibid, 20. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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and future refugee flows would bring. From 1947-1949, heated debates took place 
in the UN between member states who favored a refugee organization that 
possessed “broad responsibility” and those who favored “an agency with limited 
competence.”54 Ultimately, it was decided that the new organization’s primary 
obligation would be the protection of refugees, as opposed to the repatriation or 
resettlement of refugees, which were more politically charged concepts. In 
December 1949, the UN General Assembly voted to establish the UNHCR for a trial 
period of three years. The organization was to act as a “subsidiary organ” of the 
General Assembly with an elected High Commissioner. As the organization proved 
to be successful, its temporal and subject jurisdictions were expanded by later 
General Assembly resolutions.55 The precedent of international cooperation that 
was set within the UN by the establishment of the UNCHR paved the way for future 
collaborative efforts in crafting the 1951 Convention two years later. 
 Prior to the 1951 Convention, discussion about how to categorize refugees 
centered around three different theories and outlooks: juridical, social, and the 
individual.56 In the interwar years, refugees were defined by their personal status in 
relationship to a larger group’s status; that is, people were considered refugees only 
when they belonged to a specific group who was being denied de jure protection by 
its government.57 In the four years immediately preceding World War II, the 
juridical perspective on defining refugees gave way to the social perspective, in 
which refugees were defined as “helpless casualties of broadly based social or 
54 Ibid, 23. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid, 24. 
57 Ibid. 
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political occurrences which separate them from their home society.”58 This 
approach was adopted in an effort to include those who had lost the de facto 
protection of their home state, as opposed to just the legal protection. The third 
phase of development for defining international refugees evolved in the post-World 
War II arena, and is the one reflected in the 1951 Convention. Known as the 
individualist perspective, this outlook was revolutionary in its “rejection of group 
determination of refugee status.”59 By this standard, a refugee is a person “in search 
of an escape from perceived injustice or fundamental incompatibility with his/her 
home state.”60 No longer was a person’s refugee status contingent upon his/her 
membership in relation to a marginalized group; rather, the new goal was for 
individuals’ cases to be evaluated independently of specific social and political 
situations.  
 The 1951 Convention’s definition of who qualifies as a refugee is as follows: 
 
“Any person who, as a result of events occurring before January 1, 1951 and owing 
to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to 
such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to avail 
himself of protection of that country; or, who, not having a nationality and being 
58 Ibid, 25. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear 
or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to return to it.”61 
  
According to international refugee law expert James Hathaway, the primary 
standard of refugee status that is still used today is derived from the definition given 
in the 1951 Convention.  As stated by the UNHCR website, the Convention is both “ a 
status and rights-based instrument and is under-pinned by a number of 
fundamental principles, most notably non-discrimination, non-penalization, and 
non-refoulement.”62 The Convention calls for provisions for refugees to be 
distributed equally, without discrimination “as to race, religion, or country of 
origin.”63 Perhaps the most relevant of the three aforementioned criteria for the 
purposes of this paper is the principle of non-refoulement. UNHCR considers this 
stipulation to be “so fundamental that no reservations or derogations may be made 
to it.”64  It states that “no one shall expel or return a refugee against his or her will, 
in any manner whatsoever, to a territory where he or she fears threats to life or 
freedom.”65 In addition, the 1951 Convention maps out minimum standards that 
states hosting refugees must meet, including access to courts, primary education, 
work, and the provision for documentation.66  
61 Ibid, 32. 
62 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Text of the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees." 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
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However, it is worth noting that although states who are party to the 1951 
Convention must commit to the principle of non-refoulement, determining the 
timeframe in which danger still exists for refugees in their home countries is very 
much left to the discretion of the host states. According to international refugee law 
expert Guy Goodwin-Gill, even though party states are required to abide by non-
refoulement through time, “that time is not and cannot be determined by any 
principle of international law.”67 It is also left to the discretion of host states to find 
“durable solutions” regarding the future of its refugees, whether it be voluntary 
repatriation, local integration, or resettlement in another country.68 Insofar as a 
state is required to protect its refugees, protection against “the immediate 
eventuality is the responsibility of the country of first refuge.”69 This window for 
discretion is critical in examining the differences between German and Swedish 
policies toward Bosnian refugees; it may be able to explain how the two nations 
were able to enact drastically different policies while still remaining within the legal 
confines of the 1951 Convention.  
 The 1967 Protocol expanded upon the 1951 Convention by eliminating the 
temporal and geographical limitations, as the Convention had been drafted to 
originally be applicable only to World War II crimes that had been perpetrated in 
Europe.70 According to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, as of April 
2011, 144 states are party to the 1951 Convention, and 145 are party to the 1967 
Protocol. Among these countries that have ratified both agreements are Germany 
67 Musalo et al., Refugee Law and Policy, 41. 
68 Ibid, 42. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid, 35.  
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and Sweden.71 Additionally, this protocol helped to highlight the importance of the 
“humane and compassionate dimensions” of international refugee law.72 By 
eliminating the original restrictions on jurisdictions that had been present in the 
1951 Convention, the international community took a huge step in expanding the 
number of refugees the UNHCR would be able to aid.  
In 1992, the United Nations General Assembly passed additional resolutions 
pertaining to Bosnian refugees due to the “grave situation” on the ground in the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.73 Because the UN has decided in the lead-up to the passage of 
the 1951 Convention that its primary obligation to refugees was to protect them via 
humanitarian efforts, the General Assembly directed its 1992 concerns toward this 
principle. Resolution 46/242 from the 91st plenary meeting on August 25, 1992 
noted “widespread violations of international humanitarian law occurring within 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
including reports of mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians, 
imprisonment and abuse of civilians in detention centres and deliberate attacks on 
non-combatants…”74 The UN also strongly condemned the “ethnic cleansing” that 
was taking place.75 In provisions ten and eleven of this resolution, the General 
71 UNHCR, "States Parties to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol." Last 
modified April 11, 2011. 
72 Musalo et al., Refugee Law and Policy, 52. 
73 United Nations General Assembly, "Resolution 46/242." Last modified August 25, 
1992. 
74 Ibid. 
75 “Ethnic cleansing” is defined as the expulsion of persons from a territory 
according to ethnic background, so that ethnic homogeneity may be achieved within 
a certain domain. “Ethnic cleansing” programs were part of the larger political aims 
of Serbian leaders like Slobodan Milosevic, and were mostly directed toward the 
Bosniaks – Muslims who had lived in Bosnia for hundreds of years. “Ethnic 
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Assembly demanded that all Bosnian refugees, deportees, and displaced persons be 
“repatriated” to their homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the help of the UN and 
other “international relief agencies”. These organizations were also called upon to 
provide “rehabilitation” for the repatriated Bosnians.76  
After a period of non-compliance with the August resolution’s tenets, the 
General Assembly issued an additional resolution, 47/121 on December 18, 1992, 
which reaffirmed the “rights of all Bosnian refugees to return to their homes in 
conditions of safety and honor.”77 The Assembly also used stronger language to 
condemn the actions of Serbia and Montenegro, and urged the establishment of an 
international war crimes tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the atrocities 
that had been committed against the Bosnian people.78  While the 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol established the framework of nations’ responsibilities toward 
refugees, the 1992 UN mandates outlined the gravity of the refugee situation that 
has resulted from horrors in the Bosnian War. It is within this context that the 
actions of Sweden and Germany with respect to Bosnian refugees will be examined 
in the coming chapters.  
   
 
 
cleansing” involved fundamental violations of human rights, including rape and 
imprisonment in concentration camps. However, the origin of ethnic cleansing 
policies largely have nothing to do with ethnicity, “but rather with security national 
rights to land” (Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 236-237). 
76 Ibid. 
77 United Nations General Assembly, "Resolution 47/121." Last modified December 
18, 1992. 
78 Ibid. 
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Chapter 3: Bosnian Refugees in Sweden 
 
 
Despite being signees of the same international treaties that contain 
guidelines for refugee treatment and assimilation, the lived experiences of refugees 
in Sweden and Germany were markedly different from each other. This chapter and 
the following one will explore possible reasons for this differentiation. While there 
are likely infinite explanations for the paradox including respective national 
histories and legal loopholes, here I focus on three areas of explanation in particular: 
institutionalized ideas about citizenship, the influence of existing national 
institutions designed to facilitate refugee incorporation, and media portrayals of the 
refugees and circumstances of the Bosnian War. These three areas serve as clear 
points of comparison for Germany and Sweden, as nation’s citizenship policies and 
the expansiveness of institutions that foster integration are often reflective of 
specific national histories and state attitudes toward issues surrounding 
immigration and inclusivism. In conjunction with this, media often plays a large role 
in both shaping public opinion and in transmitting general public sentiments. Media 
can therefore be indicative of yet another dimension of the lived experiences of 
Bosnian refugees in both Sweden and Germany. This chapter will address how these 
three topics were manifested in Sweden, and the following chapter will address 
these three areas as they apply to Germany.  
 Despite being a relatively homogenous society when compared with other 
countries in Europe, Sweden has enjoyed a positive reputation over a period of 
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years regarding its immigrant inclusivism.79 As of 1990, only a couple of years 
before the start of the Bosnian War, Sweden’s foreign born population, as a percent 
of the whole population, stood at 9.2%. Between 1970 and 1990, this number 
increased by only about two percentage points. As of 2000, following the conclusion 
of the turmoil in the Balkans, the number was 11.3%. In 2012, foreign born as a 
percent of the total population approached nearly 15%.80  Given that the foreign 
born population percentage was rather stagnant for the two decades between 1970 
and 1990, the increase of nearly four percentage points over the course of just 
twelve years (2000-2012) is indicative of the Swedish government’s outlook 
regarding its responsibilities to humanitarian refugees and those seeking asylum. 
Because of its expansive welfare state, Sweden has often been the recipient of 
international praise for its willingness to accept immigrants and asylum seekers; the 
welfare state, accompanied with attitudes of inclusivism, “provide a potential 
vehicle for promoting social cohesion among various population groups.”81 
 
 
 
79 With a foreign born population of 9.2% in 1990, Sweden was significantly more 
homogenous than other northern and western European countries. Today, the 
portion of its population that is foreign born is more on par with many other 
European nations, as Sweden has taken in large numbers of humanitarian refugees 
from places like Iraq and Syria in recent years 
(http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/assessing-immigrant-integration-sweden-
after-may-2013-riots). 
80 Sofie Fredlund-Blomst, Migration Policy Institute, "Assessing Immigrant 
Integration in Sweden after the May 2013 Riots." January 16, 2014. 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/assessing-immigrant-integration-sweden-
after-may-2013-riots. 
81 Ibid. 
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National Citizenship Laws and Integration 
 
 Since 2001, the criteria for an individual to be eligible for Swedish citizenship 
have been enshrined in the Act on Swedish Citizenship. While this document went 
into effect in the years once the Bosnian refugee flow tapered off, many tenets of this 
act were crafted as a direct response to the Balkan security crisis of the 1990’s, and 
the challenges it posed for Sweden – for example, figuring out how to balance its 
humanitarian responsibilities and ideas of inclusivism all within the framework of a 
difficult economic environment. Before analyzing the contents of the document, it is 
worthwhile to consider what one of the physical properties of the document implies 
– its length. While this government policy is inclusive of essentially every 
circumstance under which an individual is eligible (or ineligible) for citizenship, the 
document itself totals only six pages. While this characteristic doesn’t necessarily 
have any significant meaning when looked at independently,  when compared with 
the German Nationality Act, which totals twenty-five pages, one is immediately in 
the position to hypothesize that overall there are less criteria that an individual 
needs to meet before he or she can be eligible for citizenship.  
 The 2001 Act on Swedish Citizenship was the culmination of a national 
conversation about immigration, refugees, and inclusion that had taken place 
throughout the mid 1990’s at the height of the Bosnian War.82 Prior to its 21st 
century makeover, the Act on Swedish Citizenship had not been updated or 
revitalized since 1950. Because the large influx of refugees from Bosnia brought the 
82 Scott McIver, “”Conceptualisations of citizenship in Sweden and the United 
Kingdom” (Phd diss., University of Edinburh, 2009), 88 
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problems that refugees face with regards to assimilation to the surface, the national 
conversation about citizenship changed from one on how to “manage” the transition 
from immigrant to citizen to a discussion that emphasized the importance of 
diversity and social integration.83 In 1996, the Swedish Parliamentary Committee 
for Immigrant Policy came to the conclusion that “the key objective for immigration 
policy [should be] a society where all have the same opportunities, rights, and 
duties.”84 While Sweden was willing and prepared to make reforms to their social 
integration policies (i.e. housing, education, labor), it was first necessary to enshrine 
these beliefs in a much more fundamental sense – by adapting citizenship criteria to 
more closely mirror inclusive attitudes.  
 According to a statement made by Gunnar Hermansson, Director of Sweden’s 
Division for Immigrant Integration and Diversity (a subdivision of the Ministry for 
Integration and Gender Equality), the idea of “making it easier to gain Swedish 
citizenship” and promoting legislation that was as “open and generous in permitting 
citizenship as possible” received political support from major Swedish parties 
throughout the late 1990’s, including the Moderate Party and the Social 
Democrats.85 One manifestation of this policy in the 2001 Act on Swedish 
Citizenship is Section 8. It reads: 
 
“An alien who has reached the age of eighteen but who is not yet twenty 
acquires Swedish citizenship on notification if he or she: 
83 Ibid, 89. 
84 Ibid, 91. 
85 Ibid, 95. 
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1. holds a permanent Swedish residence permit, and  
2. has been domiciled in Sweden since reaching the age of thirteen 
or, if the child is stateless, fifteen.”86 
 
This change in policy was supremely important for deciding the futures of the 
thousands of children who had arrived in Sweden alongside their parents after 
fleeing the atrocities of the Bosnian War. In this situation, a child’s citizenship status 
– and thus a child’s options about legally living and remaining in quite possibly the 
only stable state they had ever known – was not contingent upon his or her place of 
birth or the citizenship status of his or her parents. The citizenship status of children 
born abroad is addressed again in Section 11 of the same document. It reads: 
 
“An alien can apply for and be granted Swedish citizenship (be naturalized) if 
he or she: 
1. has provided proof of his or her identity, 
2. has reached the age of eighteen, 
3. holds a permanent Swedish residence permit, 
4. has been domiciled in Sweden 
a. for the previous two years in the case of Danish, Finnish, 
Icelandic, or Norwegian citizens, 
86 Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, "The 2001 Swedish Citizenship Act." 
Last modified May 22, 2008. http://www.government.se/sb/d/3926/a/29191. 
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b. for the previous four years in the case if a stateless person 
or a person who is considered to be a refugee under 
Chapter 4, Section 1 of the Aliens Act, 
c. for the previous five years for other aliens, and 
5. has led and can be expected to lead a respectable life.”87 
 
Although this Act stipulates a shorter domiciliary period for citizens of other 
Scandinavian nations than for other aliens, a waiting period of only four years was 
instituted specifically for those who held refugee status (who could provide proof of 
identity. Those refugees who could not provide proof of identity had a domiciliary 
period of eight years before they could be naturalized.)88 This relatively brief 
required domiciliary period is demonstrative of Sweden’s commitment to providing 
an attainable path to citizenship for both underage and adult refugees. By making 
the citizenship application process straightforward and easy to understand, Sweden 
was able to open the door to more effective and efficient integration programs.  
 Sweden’s lenient attitudes toward the notion of citizenship can also be seen 
in the debate over whether or not to permit dual citizenship. Professor Scott McIver, 
who translated numerous Swedish government pamphlets and other sources into 
English, goes into great detail as to how this national conversation surrounding dual 
citizenship unfolded. Because Sweden’s population was becoming increasingly 
heterogeneous, government officials felt that it was more necessary to re-evaluate 
the provision of the 1950 Act on Swedish Citizenship that prohibited the possession 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid, Section 12. 
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of dual citizenship (that is, holding Swedish citizenship in conjunction with another 
country’s citizenship).89 “Attachment to one’s original citizenship as part of one’s 
identity was seen to be arguably the most important factor in all the interplaying 
elements that arise with the change of citizenship.”90  Due to the changing nature of 
Sweden’s population, many began to feel that essentially forcing immigrants to 
choose between loyalty to their homeland and loyalty to their new country of 
residence was not a good way of fostering feelings of integration and belonging in 
immigrant communities. The Swedish Parliamentary Committee appointed to 
research the relationship between dual citizenship possession and political 
involvement in Sweden’s national elections found that allowing dual citizenship was 
beneficial in terms of increasing suffrage. In their report (translated by Scott 
McIver), the Committee argued, “for the individual, such participation can foster 
integration through an enhanced feeling of belonging in Swedish society and 
through grater possibilities for actively participating in political life.”91 
 Because the Swedish government was able to recognize that individuals’ 
identity (and how they are able to subsequently express that identity) lay at the core 
of citizenship and civic integration, they were able to address it in literature 
distributed to new immigrants. In a 2002 pamphlet titled “Swedes from the whole 
world – Choosing citizenship in the age of globalisation,” the government made a 
push to emphasize that citizenship did more than secure certain legal privileges. The 
pamphlet acknowledged that citizenship also had an emotional component. It 
89 McIver, “Conceptualisations of Citizenship”, 100. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid, 100. 
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depicted Swedes that had already been naturalized asking questions that all recent 
immigrants would have been able to relate to, such as “where do I belong?” and 
“where do I have my roots?”92 The focus on weaving the concept of citizenship with 
the concept of integration by permitting dual citizenship was the most fundamental 
policy of Swedish legislation in this area throughout the late 1990’s and early 
2000’s.  
Prior to this push for dual citizenship, the Swedish government held very 
different ideas as to the best methods to foster integration. While the old school of 
thought in this field – which was dominant in the years before the Bosnian War – 
still wanted to preserve Sweden’s multicultural landscape, there were concerns 
what dual citizenship would mean for state security, which dated back to findings of 
a 1985 Parliamentary Committee. This committee was concerned that dual 
citizenship would cause problems with double voting, diplomatic support, military 
service duties, and national loyalty. In other words, would an individual’s being a 
citizen of another nation somehow undermine their commitment to the Swedish 
state and Swedish values?93 By changing its policy to permit individuals to retain 
citizenship of their home countries, Sweden became more inclusive by expanding 
ideas about what it meant to be Swedish. This new outlook embraced cultural 
pluralism in the name of diversifying Swedish society, thus making it a more 
hospitable and friendly place for newly naturalized citizens to live.  
Once the criteria for determining citizenship had been expanded, it naturally 
followed that Sweden needed to examine the effectiveness of their integration 
92 Ibid, 101. 
93 Ibid, 99. 
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policies. As part of their expansive welfare state, Sweden established government 
ministries and institutions specifically designed to ensure that the needs of some of 
the most vulnerable members of society were met, especially those of persons who 
had been traumatically displaced from their home countries, like Bosnian refugees. 
The very existence of these ministries, including (but not limited to) the Ministry of 
Integration and Gender Equality and the Ministry of Culture and Democracy, is 
evidence of the Swedish government’s commitment to easing the transition of 
immigrants into greater society.94  
In 2009, the Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality issued a fact sheet 
explaining the goals of Swedish integration policy, and in what areas such policies 
needed improvement. As stated in the fact sheet, the overarching goal of integration 
policy “is equal rights, obligations, and opportunities for all, regardless of ethnic or 
cultural background.”95 While many different government ministries are 
responsible for overseeing specific issues for the entire Swedish population, 
regardless of nationality or race (e.g. the Ministry of Employment oversees the 
incorporation of all Swedes into the labor market; the Swedish Public Employment 
Service supports unemployed Swedes of all background), the Ministry of Integration 
and Gender Equality coordinates all integration work, and regularly cooperates with 
other government institutions to ensure that integration is able to occur on various 
levels.96 In addition to overseeing other government ministries, the Ministry of 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, "Integration Policy Fact Sheet." Last 
modified December 2009. 
http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/13/77/34/5b7683a6.pdf. 
96 Ibid. 
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Integration and Gender Equality has responsibilities of its own, including “the 
introduction of new arrivals into Sweden, helping new arrivals procure Swedish 
citizenship, combating discrimination and racism, the promotion of democracy and 
human rights, the development of urban districts with extensive social exclusion, 
and follow-ups and evaluation in the area of integration.”97 
It is clear that the Swedish government is committed to easing the process of 
integration for refugees based on its initiatives to expand citizenship, establish 
government ministries to oversee integration, and its tendency to use rhetoric of 
equality and inclusion. Of course, such government initiatives do not occur in a 
vacuum, and are vulnerable to being thwarted and watered down once they are 
introduced into reality. The following subsection will provide the background of the 
economic and political context in which integration policies were implemented, as 
this truly shows the complexities of policymaking. 
 
It’s Complicated – The Relationship Between Policy and Reality 
 
 In the 1990’s, when the bulk of Bosnian refugees were arriving on Swedish 
soil, Sweden was in the midst of an economic downturn, and the government was in 
the process of undertaking a series of tough economic reforms in order to reduce 
the deficit.98 Although the Swedish welfare state was still one of the most extensive 
in the world, according to Abiri, the benefit cuts Sweden had to make were 
97 Ibid. 
98 Elizabeth Abiri, “The Changing Praxis of ‘Generosity’: Swedish Refugee Policy 
during the 1990s,” Journal of Refugee Studies 13 (2000): 12.  
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“troubling” to many Swedes, as they marked the reversal of a trend of ever-
expanding welfare benefits.99 Unemployment levels also soared during this period 
to rise to levels “previously unheard of in a country aiming at ‘full employment.”100 
These social afflictions were occurring in conjunction with the start of the war in the 
Balkans; from 1991 to 1992, Sweden saw its number of applications for asylum 
increase from 27,000 to 84,000 (about 40,000 of these asylum seekers were actually 
from Bosnia – tens of thousands of others were from other places in the former 
Yugoslavia, like Kosovo).101 Thus, tens of thousands of displaced and desperate 
refugees were flooding into Sweden at the same time the Swedish economy was 
experiencing a recession. The pressure that this situation placed on entities like 
businesses and housing developments created an environment in which true 
inclusion and integration were difficult to achieve. 
One of the most crucial aspects to fostering integration among immigrants is 
access to employment. Possessing a job provides immigrants the opportunities to 
build relationships and networks with native citizens in the workplace; it gives them 
the financial freedom to participate in various social activities, receive a better 
education, and live in better neighborhoods. A study conducted by ethnologist Maja 
Povrzanović Frykman in 2009 examined the attitudes of thirty-five Bosnian 
refugees toward their employment prospects and paths. Although most of her 
evidence is anecdotal, it is supplemented by government data, and her sample pulls 
interviewees from a variety of communities (mostly urban). First and foremost, 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid, 19. 
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Frykman noted that the younger and higher educated a refugee was, the more likely 
that refugee was employed.102 Employment figures also support the statement that 
immigrants had a higher probability of employment if they were trained in a 
vocation as opposed to having only a general education.103 Another important factor 
in examining Bosnian refugee employment was location, as suggested by Jan Ekberg 
and Mikal Ohlson in their 1997 study that focused on the employment status of 
Bosnian refugees who had come to Sweden between 1993 and 1994 (translated by 
Frykman). Ekberg and Ohlson found that in some municipalities, nearly 80% of 
registered Bosnian refugees were employed, while in others only 10% were 
employed.104 Employment rates were higher in regions where “the economic sector 
was characterized by small private enterprises.”105  
Once Bosnian refugees were settled in their new homes, their integration 
was transferred into the hands of the local authorities who ran refugee introduction 
programs. To prepare them for opportunities in the labor market, refugees were 
entitled to a year’s worth of free Swedish language and “practice employment” 
courses.106 Despite these benefits, many refugees in Frykman’s study reported 
feeling extremely disoriented throughout their initial orientation period, which 
102 Maja Povrzanović Frykman, “The Struggle for Recognition: Bosnian Refugees’ 
Employment Experiences in Sweden,” Refugee Quarterly Survey 31, (54) 
103 Frykman, “Struggle for Recognition,” 55. 
104 J. Ekberg & M. Ohlson, “Flyktingars arbetsmarknad är inte alltid nattsvart”, 
Ekonomisk Debatt, 28(5), 2000, 431–439. 
105 Frykman, “The Struggle for Recognition,” 56. 
106 M. Appelqvist, “Party Politics and the Bosnian Question: The Swedish Decision to 
Grant Permanent Residence”, Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies, 26(1), 2000, 101–
102. 
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translated to feelings of hopelessness and incompetence.107 Refugees were further 
frustrated by the fact that many of their degrees from universities in Bosnia were 
non-transferrable to Swedish employers. Frykman quotes a Bosnian refugee who 
had been a building engineer prior to his relocation to Sweden. When the man 
reflected on the 11-year period of his taking jobs for which he was vastly 
overqualified, he stated he had “lost any illusion. [He had] weakened [his] criteria. 
[He] was never asked for an interview. [He] knew people who drove taxies in Malmö 
that were also building engineers.”108  
At the conclusion of the Swedish language and project-employment classes, 
many refugees still felt they were not sufficiently prepared to find work. Refugees’ 
criticism was largely directed at the Swedish Public Employment service, as many 
Bosnians felt the agency was not doing enough to provide them with leads and 
contacts in the labor market.109 Of course, this negative experience with 
employment was not something that applied to every Bosnian refugee. Others in 
Frykman’s study spoke highly of the Public Employment Service and its employees 
(who were almost always native Swedes). Some refugees credited the Public 
Employment Service with opening doors to opportunities for them, which allowed 
them to live “far better in Sweden than they would have in Yugoslavia.”110 However, 
when studying the attitudes of Bosnian refugees toward their employment 
prospects, it is important to keep in mind the economic context of the period. 
Because Sweden was undergoing a recession and unemployment numbers were 
107 Frykman, “The Struggle for Recognition,” 57. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid, 58. 
110 Ibid. 
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high across the board, it is possible that many Bosnians could not find jobs as a 
direct result of this situation; assuming that factors like agency incompetence, lack 
of willingness to assist among the Public Employment Service employees, and 
discrimination were solely responsible for these difficulties would be too big of a 
leap.  
There are numerous other issues that have caused it be difficult for Bosnians 
to find jobs. As stated in Frykman’s interviews, many refugees were quite surprised 
at the necessity of having connections and networks throughout the labor market, 
whether it was to a Swede or to another refugee who was able to secure a good job. 
In Bosnia, these types of connections were often closely affiliated with “customary 
nepotism” that tended to occur along political lines; in turn, many Bosnians believed 
that networks and connections had no place in a “law-abiding country like 
Sweden.”111 It was also difficult for refugees to start their own businesses when they 
could not find work in Swedish companies. Many Bosnians reported that they did 
not feel like they knew enough about business building, as the dream of owning 
one’s own business was not a big part of the employment culture in Bosnia. In 
addition to lack of confidence in their business skills, many refugees felt they were 
not capable of starting a business that used Swedish as its primary language.112 
Even when refugees were able to find decent jobs that matched their skillsets, many 
of them attributed it to being lucky by being “at the right place at the right time” in 
the labor market rather than to their qualifications.113  
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid, 59. 
113 Ibid, 63. 
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Despite the challenges and downward mobility that many Bosnian refugees 
confronted in the labor market, on the whole, most of Frykman’s interviewees 
considered themselves to be happy and well adjusted to their new lives in Sweden. 
Many of them “expressed pride at their work achievements.”114 Even though these 
achievements did not necessarily result in the same high social status the refugees 
had enjoyed in Bosnia, they were proud of their ability to support themselves and 
their families after starting over in a foreign country with little more than the 
clothes on their backs. Refugees also reported finding hope in the bright futures of 
their children, many of whom received Swedish educations from young ages.115 
Moreover, the refugees were thankful to be able to reside in a country where so 
many of their friends and family members lived nearby, without the fear of being 
repatriated or resettled.116  
 
The Impact of Housing on Inclusion 
 
The impact of Swedish housing policies on Bosnian refugees is an additional 
dimension of integration policy where reality did not meet intent. As Sweden’s rates 
of immigration began to increase slowly beginning in the 1970s, so has the 
percentage of the population that lives in what can be called segregated areas. As of 
2008, 20% of Sweden’s foreign born population lived in an area where more than 
40% of the rest of the population was foreign born. In contrast, “60 percent of native 
114 Ibid, 79. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
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Swedes lived in areas where the majority of the population was also Swedish, and 
20 percent lived in areas that were virtually 100 percent Swedish.”117 It is easy to 
see how this type of segregation between native and foreign-born communities 
would inhibit integration. In addition to limiting opportunities for immigrants to 
form relationships and connections with native Swedes, segregated housing 
inhibited networks from being established with respect to the labor market. Thus, 
the lack of integration with respect to housing had a direct and negative influence 
on labor market integration.  
While Sweden had been experimenting with various state-directed housing 
policies since the early 1960’s, it had most recently been resurrected in 1985. In 
order to avoid disproportionately large concentrations of immigrants in the three 
main metropolitan regions – Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö – immigrants and 
refugees were placed more evenly throughout different municipalities, including in 
less urban areas.118 Due to the large influx of refugees during the Bosnian War, 
housing availability became much more limited, and the dispersal policy had to be 
abandoned. As a result, immigrants were placed in locations wherever there was 
sufficient availability; the state of the mid-recession labor markets did not 
necessarily play a role in determining placement.119 Although immigrants were free 
to relocate if they found housing elsewhere, many of them did not have the 
resources to undertake this; immigrants were also required to participate in an 
117 http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/assessing-immigrant-integration-
sweden-after-may-2013-riots 
118 Georges Lemaitre, "The Integration of Immigrants into the Labor Market: The 
Case of Sweden," Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2007): 
14. 
119 Lemaitre, “Integration of Immigrants,” 15. 
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eighteen month long introduction and orientation (which included aforementioned 
classes in Swedish and employment practice) in the municipality in which they had 
originally been placed.120 Thus, it was all but obligatory that immigrants remained 
in community in which they had been placed for eighteen months. Although the 
refugees received social assistance throughout this time period, many felt the 
frustrations of trying to find employment in order to secure their future.  
It is worth noting that dispersion policies were slightly different for those 
who entered Sweden as asylum seekers, as was the case with many Bosnian 
refugees. Asylum seekers were permitted to settle in any municipality they wished, 
and many chose to live where they already had friends or family who had arrived in 
previous years as economic migrants, or another type of immigrant.121 However, 
because the recession was in full swing during the Bosnian War, many asylum 
seekers were settling in areas were employment was already in short supply; this 
compounded integration and employment difficulties. Another effect of refugees 
being able to self-select their settlement location was that because their decision 
was often based on the location of friends and family of the same ethnic background, 
refugees were unknowingly segregating themselves from native communities and 
from the job opportunities that came with having connections with native Swedes.  
Despite efforts to try to disperse immigrants and refugees, ultimately many 
were compelled to live in areas where there was the most availability. Due to the 
Miljonprogram (Millions Program) that was started by the Social Democratic Party 
in 1964, most of the availability was in the three main metropolitan centers – the 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
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same three cities that the government initially did not want to overload with refugee 
populations. The Miljonprogram was “an ambitious public housing program…whose 
objective was to meet the growing demand for housing in urban areas, where 85% 
of Sweden’s population lives.”122 Between 1964 and 1974, over a million new homes 
were constructed. Although these neighborhoods were originally home to working 
class Swedes, they are now mainly occupied by “high concentrations of immigrant 
origin populations.”123 Located in the suburbs of Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö, 
these neighborhoods have come to be known as betongförorter, which roughly 
translates as “concrete jungle” and “immigrant ghetto.”124 Although the existence of 
segregated communities is not inherently problematic, such communities provide 
huge obstacles to processes of social integration and inclusion.  
 
The Media – The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly  
 
In addition to examining how citizenship legislation and government policies 
can impact Bosnian refugee integration, it may also be useful to briefly examine how 
refugees were portrayed in the media. This can provide insight into how the 
Swedish population reacted to the refugee influx, what the people thought their 
nation’s responsibility toward the refugees should be, and how receptive they were 
in general to the Bosnian refugees. In 1990 – prior to the Bosnian War, but amidst 
the collapse of the Soviet Union – the Swedish media delivered dire reports of the 
122 Fredlund-Blomst, "Assessing Immigrant Integration in Sweden after the May 
2013 Riots." January 16, 2014. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
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mass migrant flows that were anticipated in the wake of the fall of the eastern 
bloc.125 Newspapers reiterated reports from “experts” who claimed that migrants 
could number between 20 and 50 million; they reported on the emergency meetings 
that government ministries were holding to prepare for a mass immigration of 
Russians.126 Although the storm drummed up by the media about expectations of 
mass emigration from Russia never came to fruition, Sweden was faced with 
another large-scale refugee crisis two years later. 
The large increase in asylum seekers in the early days of the Bosnian War 
caused mixed reactions throughout Sweden, as asylum applications rose from 
27,000 in 1991 to 84,000 in 1992. From the beginning of the conflict, the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ensuing war made headline news throughout 
the nation. Although much attention was paid to the political implications of the 
collapse, news media provided ample coverage of the humanitarian horrors that 
were occurring in Bosnia as a result of “ethnic cleansing” policies.127 Due to the 
coverage of the brutalities being committed specifically in Bosnia, on the whole, the 
Swedish people were very empathetic toward Bosnians. However, when it became 
public knowledge that the majority of Yugoslavian asylum seekers were coming 
from Kosovo, and not Bosnia, “this fueled a national debate on the ‘genuineness’ of 
125 Abiri, “Changing Praxis of Generosity,” 16 
126 Ibid. 
127 “Ethnic cleansing” programs were part of the larger political aims of Serbian 
leaders like Slobodan Milosevic, and were mostly directed toward the Bosniaks – 
Muslims who had lived in Bosnia for hundreds of years. “Ethnic cleansing” involved 
fundamental violations of human rights, including rape and imprisonment in 
concentration camps. 
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asylum applicants.”128 As a result, asylum seekers from Kosovo were “treated with 
suspicion,” and the majority of them were ultimately denied asylum.129 This 
provides evidence to support the idea that the media played a large role in shaping 
public perception of Yugoslav refugees. Because most of the coverage focused on 
atrocities in Bosnia at the expense of what was occurring in other parts of 
Yugoslavia, Sweden became more inclined to want to aid Bosnian refugees. It would 
seem that sparse media coverage of events occurring in places such as Montenegro 
and Kosovo was one of the many factors that worked against asylum applicants 
from these locations. 
Although the Swedish government and general population alike recognized 
the need to assist displaced Bosnians, the media played host to a debate as to what 
the best methods of assistance were. Some argued that the act of granting asylum to 
Bosnian refugees could “indirectly assist the persecutors, for whom the creation of 
refugees was an end in itself, and part of the strategy of ethnic cleansing.”130 
Ultimately, it was decided to grant permanent residency status to the 40,000 
Bosnians who were awaiting asylum decisions, while people from other areas of 
Yugoslavia were granted temporary protection that lasted six months, or were not 
granted protection at all. This strategy is representative of Sweden’s concern for 
those who were being actively persecuted, and how they wished to honor their 
humanitarian responsibilities while still maintaining a relatively strict quota for 
other refugee and immigrant populations. 
128 Abiri, “Changing Praxis of Generosity,” 19. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid, 20. 
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Conclusion 
 
For decades, Sweden has enjoyed a reputation throughout the world for 
having a generous and inclusive refugee policy. This policy is reflected in numerous 
ways, including in citizenship legislation and government social policies. With a goal 
of making it more attainable for refugees to receive citizenship, the 2001 Act on 
Swedish Citizenship was reformed. Some reforms included making it easier for 
children of refugees to obtain citizenship, requiring a shorter waiting period for 
adult refugees, and the allowance for people to hold dual citizenship. Sweden’s 
policies to provide Bosnian refugees with opportunities to begin their lives over 
again are also representative of the government’s desire to foster inclusivism and 
integration. In addition to providing guidance in the labor and housing markets, the 
government also provided refugees with classes in the Swedish language and 
employment practice.  
Despite these good intentions, these policies were not as successful once they 
were implemented. Because of other factors like an economic recession and pre-
existing housing segregation, Bosnian refugees were not presented with as many 
opportunities to integrate as government officials had once hoped. Although 
coverage in the media helped to bring attention and sympathy to the plight of the 
refugees, many government policies ultimately fell short. Regardless of the 
limitations that reality presented to integration policies, many refugees reported 
feeling satisfied with their new lives in Sweden. Although policies were not as 
effective as initially planned, the stability that living in Sweden with legal residency 
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status provided coupled with the good intent behind the policies helped to make 
many refugees feel relatively welcome and comfortable. 
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Chapter 4: Bosnian Refugees in Germany 
 
 
 Just as Sweden has historically enjoyed a positive, global reputation 
regarding its immigrant and refugee policies, Germany serves as Sweden’s foil. From 
the beginning of the Bosnian War in 1992, approximately 345,000 Bosnian refugees 
poured into Germany to seek asylum. Although Germany and Sweden respectively 
received the largest number of Bosnian refugees out of all the European Union 
member states, Germany’s 345,000 more than quadrupled Sweden’s 80,000. It is 
easy to imagine how such a staggering figure could place existing German 
institutions and infrastructure under significant pressure. Although this chapter will 
examine inclusion processes primarily through the three lenses of 
conceptualizations of citizenship, institutions that foster integration, and media 
representations, it is worth acknowledging that Germany’s history has had a 
significant impact on the evolution of its immigration and refugee policies. Because 
the implications of German history vis-à-vis the history of immigrant incorporation 
is a critical piece of the puzzle, this chapter will place an emphasis on this topic by 
tracing the development of the concept of German citizenship. 
 
Politics and History of German Citizenship 
 
 Since its very inception as a nation in the mid-19th century, being “German” 
has had a very specific meaning that, for most of its existence, has centered on ideas 
such as nationalism and unification. Up until the 1990’s, even the opportunity to 
become German was limited to those who had been born to parents who possessed 
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German citizenship and were of German ancestry. This policy, known as 
Abstammungsprinzip, helped to make Germany’s citizenship 
 and naturalization policies the most restrictive and exclusionary in Western 
Europe. 131 Throughout Western Europe, it has long been the common practice to 
grant citizenship to individuals born within state territory, independent of ancestral 
origins.132  
Eli Nathans, an expert on the evolution of German nationality and citizenship, 
hypothesizes in his book “The Politics of Citizenship in Germany” that restrictive 
exclusionary citizenship policies date back to the days of the German Confederation, 
prior to the unification of the German nation. Nathans claims it is these policies that 
still comprise the foundations of German citizenship as we know it today. Rogers 
Brubaker, another scholar who has done extensive work on the politics of German 
citizenship, points to these individual state policies as evidence that the idea of a 
German nation emerged long before the idea of a single German state, whereas in 
other western European nations, ideas of nationhood formed long after the state 
had been politically unified.133 
 In the 1830’s, each of the thirty-eight sovereign states and four free cities 
within the German Confederation was responsible for crafting its own citizenship 
and nationalization policies.134 Due to the economic competition between the states, 
many found it fitting and necessary to restrict granting citizenship to “desirable 
131 Eli Nathans, The Politics of Citizenship in Germany: Ethnicity, Utility, and 
Nationalism, (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2004), 1. 
132 Nathans, Politics of Citizenship, 2. 
133 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 6. 
134 Nathans, Politics of Citizenship, 26. 
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immigrants,” or those immigrants whom governments felt would ultimately 
contribute to the economic well being of state. Often, immigrants who could not 
prove that they had “sufficient resources” to support themselves or practiced a 
trade from which the state could benefit were denied citizenship on the grounds 
that they may one day be in need of poor relief.135 In addition to restricting 
citizenship on an economic basis, many German states historically excluded certain 
national and ethnic groups, specifically Poles and Jews.  
In order to develop concrete examples of these exclusionary policies, 
Nathans focuses on Prussian naturalization and citizenship laws, as Otto von 
Bismarck unified Germany under Prussian leadership and legal codes in 1871. He 
points to the 1842 Prussian law known as the Untertanengesetz, which highlighted 
descent from a Prussian father as the basis for “transmission of Prussian 
citizenship.”136 This law also required that members of the nobility pledge their 
allegiance to the Prussian state, and forsake nationalist ties with any other German 
state (it is easy to see how this parallels contemporary debates over permitting dual 
citizenship). Although there were some failed, localized movements that cropped up 
during the revolutions of 1848 that attempted to liberalize citizenship laws, these 
ideas largely petered out along with the movements themselves.137 
Following unification in 1871, Otto von Bismarck expanded the foundations 
of Prussia’s citizenship policies to the rest of the states in what was now known as 
Germany; he proceeded to institute even more “explicitly ethnically exclusionary 
135 Ibid, 32. 
136 Ibid, 55. 
137 Ibid, 59. 
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policies,” which Nathans attributes to a combination of factors related to Bismarck’s 
personal political beliefs, including his “calculations about national interest, his 
defense of authoritarian political institutions, and his combative personality.”138 As 
a result, he put into effect increasingly discriminatory policies against Jews, Poles, 
Czechs, Danes, and even native-born German women. Such narrow ideas of what it 
meant to be a German citizen were at the core of the 1913 Nationality Act, and 
reigned supreme throughout the World War I and imperialistic era. Following a 
defeat in World War I and a transition from an imperial government to a republic, 
German citizenship policy proved to be reactionary, and became even more 
xenophobic. For example, Prussia imposed a ten-year residency requirement for 
citizenship in 1920, only to increase it to a fifteen-year period in 1921.139  
While ethnicity and race had always been integral, determining factors for 
obtaining German citizenship, the Nazi regime that came to power in the 1930’s 
made those features the sole foundation of citizenship criteria. Because the Nazis’ 
mission of creating a “superior Aryan race” depended on the government’s ability to 
control what people were considered Germans, citizenship and naturalization laws 
became one of the central focuses of the regime. Rather than continue the policies of 
decades past that focused on both ancestral origin and economic potential as 
citizenship criteria, the Nazis created rigid racial hierarchies. These hierarchies 
became “the guiding markers of citizenship and naturalization because they 
determined who would be accepted, who would be tolerated, and who needed to be 
138 Ibid, 114. 
139 Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood, 87. 
 57 
                                                        
eliminated from the German nation.”140 These fabricated hierarchies were very 
much the product of 19th century racial theories born out of “scientific racism.” 
However, they were the guiding principles in determining citizenship status. Those 
with “full German blood” were deemed Reichsbürger and therefore had more 
political rights, while those classified as Staatsangehörige had second-class 
status.141 The Nazis also used their new hierarchies to justify revoking citizenship 
on a scale never before seen. 
Although both the governmental and social frameworks of post-war 
Germany have been reflective of the atrocities perpetuated throughout World War II 
(as well as deep-seated hatred of Nazi policies), many of the policies regarding 
citizenship remained unchanged for decades. Although German citizenship was 
restored to those who had been cruelly stripped of it, naturalization policies 
remained centered on having Germanic ancestry. It was not until the late 1990’s, in 
the wake of the Bosnian refugee crisis and increased movement between the 
European nations in general, that these policies were finally liberalized.  
 While this type of exclusivism in terms of citizen in-groups and out-groups 
was at its height under the Third Reich, much of the body of the German Nationality 
Act that remains in force today has its origins dating back to 1913. In fact, the 
physical Act remained largely unchanged until it was amended in 2000, which 
loosened the criteria by which an individual could obtain German citizenship for the 
first time in seventy-seven years. The act underwent subsequent amendments in 
140 Nathans, Politics of Citizenship, 157. 
141 Diemut Majer, "Non-Germans" under the Third Reich, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2003), 112. 
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2005, 2007, and 2014.142 Although the channels through which a foreigner may 
acquire German citizenship have undergone an opening within the last decade and a 
half, Bosnian refugees arrived on German soil at a time in which foreigners, asylum 
seekers included, had little recourse to find a way to remain in Germany on a 
permanent basis.  
According to Germany’s Federal Foreign Office and to the German Nationality 
Act, since 2000, children born in Germany to non-German parents “automatically 
acquire German citizenship if one parent has been legally resident in Germany for at 
least eight years and has a permanent right of residence.”143 This is found in Section 
4(3) of the German Nationality Act: 
 
3) A child of foreign parents shall acquire German citizenship by birth in 
Germany if one parent  
1. has been legally ordinarily resident in Germany for eight years and  
2. has been granted a permanent right of residence or as a national of 
Switzerland or as a family member of a national of Switzerland possesses a 
residence permit on the basis of the Agreement of 21 June 1999 between the 
European Community and its Member States on the one hand and the Swiss 
142 German Federal Foreign Office, "Law on Nationality." Last modified December 
20, 2013. Accessed http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/EN/EinreiseUndAufenthalt/Staatsangehoerigkeitsrecht_node.html. 
143 Ibid. 
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Confederation on the other hand on the free movement of persons (Federal 
Law Gazette 2001 II p. 810).144  
Despite the advances this law made, it is worth noting that many children born 
to foreign parents under such circumstances also acquired the citizenship of their 
parents. Once that child reached twenty-three years of age, the newly established 
“option model”(Optionspflicht) became applicable. As detailed in a booklet 
circulated prior to when the amended Nationality Act went into effect, the “option 
model” is described as follows: 
“Persons who become Germans by right of birth and who at the same time acquire 
the nationality of their parents, must after attaining the age of majority and at the 
latest by their 23rd birthday opt for one nationality: 
• Where they make a declaration to the effect that they wish to retain foreign 
citizenship, they will lose German citizenship. The same will apply where 
they have not made any declaration by their 23rd birthday. 
• Where they decide in favour of German citizenship, they will need as a matter of 
principle to furnish evidence by their 23rd birthday that they have lost the 
other citizenship. 
• Where giving up the other citizenship is not possible or cannot reasonably be 
expected, multiple nationality can be accepted. In this case, an application for 
retention of the other nationality must be made by the 21st birthday, even if 
144German Federal Ministry of the Interior, "Nationality Act of 22 July 1913." Last 
modified November 13, 2014. 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzestexte/EN/Staatsangehoerigkeitsges
etz_englisch.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 
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at that point in time it is still not clear whether proceedings for release from 
that nationality might not after all be successful. 
The young persons in question will be informed about the option model by the 
authorities on attainment of the age of majority.”145 
 
In other words, children born to foreign parents in Germany were not permitted 
to hold dual citizenship after the age of twenty-three. If a child wished to retain the 
privileges of German citizenship, then he or she was compelled to relinquish the 
citizenship of their parents’ homeland, and vice versa. Dual citizenship remained a 
legal impossibility in Germany until the Second Act Amending the Nationality Act 
went into force on December 20, 2014.146 Otto Schily, Federal Minister of the 
Interior, encapsulated the monumental nature of this amendment with respect to 
feeling of integration and belonging in his foreword to the booklet containing the 
new "Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht," or nationality law. Published in August 1999, 
Schily wrote: 
“At the heart of the reform is the supplementing of the traditional principle of 
descent (jus sanguinis) by the acquisition of nationality by birth. For children 
born in Germany of foreign parents, this makes it easier for them to identify 
with their home country of Germany. They are given the chance to grow up 
as Germans among Germans.” 
145 “Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht", booklet published by the Official Federal 
Government Representative for Matters relating to Foreigners, Federal Ministry of 
the Interior, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, (August 
1999). 
146 German Federal Foreign Office, "Law on Nationality." Last modified December 
20, 2013. Accessed http://www.auswaertiges- 
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“Enshrined in the new Act is a further important opportunity for integration: 
the shortening of the naturalisation period for foreigners who have lived in 
Germany for a long time. Since integration is not a one-way street, this 
opportunity entails certain minimum requirements. Anyone wishing to live 
permanently in Germany must respect our constitution and our legal system. 
It also goes without saying that he or she will have to learn German. 
Integration can only succeed where there is a will on both sides – among 
Germans and among the foreigners living in Germany. 
Admittedly, the new framing of German nationality law cannot bring about 
integration "by order". What it does do, however, is give those fellow citizens 
from abroad who live here permanently a clear sign of our care and concern 
and of our resolve to foster the peaceful co-existence of all men and women, 
irrespective of their cultural origin.”147 
 
 Although this amendment did not totally eliminate the ancestry component 
from citizenship requirements, the 2000 law provided an alternative means to 
acquiring citizenship for those who were not born to native German parents. 
However, the possibility of acquiring citizenship through birthright is still listed as 
the primary means of becoming German in Section 4(1) of the Nationality Act: 
147 Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht", booklet published by the Official Federal 
Government Representative for Matters relating to Foreigners, Federal Ministry of 
the Interior, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, (August 
1999). 
 62 
                                                        
“(1) A child shall acquire German citizenship by birth if one parent possesses 
German citizenship. Where at the time of the birth only the father is a 
German national, and where for proof of descent under German law 
recognition or determination of paternity is necessary, acquisition shall be 
dependent on recognition or determination of paternity with legal effect 
under German law; the declaration of recognition must be submitted or the 
procedure for determination must have commenced before the child reaches 
the age of 23.”148  
“Safe Third State” Law – Impact and Justification 
Although recent amendments to the Nationality Act demonstrate that 
German nationality and naturalization laws are starting to fall into step with their 
liberal Western European counterparts, none of these reforms were extant at the 
time of the Bosnian refugee influx. Because Bosnian asylum seekers had essentially 
no existing path to citizenship in Germany, they had no certain legal future in the 
country. In addition to being confronted with legal difficulties due to restrictive 
citizenship laws, the German state’s asylum laws presented yet another obstacle to a 
secure future.  
Prior to 1993, Article 16a(1) of the Basic Law made it so that Germany had 
one of the most generous asylum policies in Europe. It stated that, “Anybody 
148 German Federal Ministry of the Interior, "Nationality Act of 22 July 1913." Last 
modified November 13, 2014. 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzestexte/EN/Staatsangehoerigkeitsges
etz_englisch.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 
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prosecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right of asylum.”149 Hundreds of 
thousands of Bosnians took advantage of this generous policy and poured into 
Germany, where many already had friends and family living in the country as guest 
workers.150 Once displaced Bosnians were in the country, they were permitted to 
file applications for asylum. Even if asylum was not immediately granted following 
the initial filing of the application with the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 
(known in German by the acronym BAMF), the appeal process was lengthy, and 
applicants were permitted to remain in Germany for the months or years it took for 
their case to be re-examined.151 This option ceased to exist for Bosnian refugees on 
July 1, 1993, when Section 16a(2) of the Basic Law – known as the Safe Third State 
principle – went into effect. This amendment represented “a fundamental shift away 
from the unqualified right to seek asylum in Germany.”152 Section 16a(2) greatly 
limited the applicability of Section 16a(1) by restricting asylum applications from 
those who entered Germany by way of a “safe third state.” The Amendment defines 
“safe third state” as “members of the European Community, the Council of Europe, 
and countries guaranteeing the application of the 1950 European Convention on 
Refugees and the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees.”153 The Bundestag even went so 
far as to explicitly provide a list of countries that were classified as “safe third 
149 Ibid. 
150 William S Walker, German and Bosnian Voices in Times of Crisis, (Indianapolis: 
Dog Ear Publishing, 2010), 4. 
151 Walker, German and Bosnian Voices, 5. 
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states”, which included Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Norway, Sweden, 
Poland, and Switzerland.154 
Due to Amendment 16a(2), the only refugees who were permitted to apply 
for German asylum were those who had not reached Germany by way of the 
aforementioned countries. Because Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Switzerland all border Germany on the southern and eastern sides, these countries 
effectively served as a ring of buffer states between Germany and the war-torn 
Balkans. Unless a Bosnian refugee had been able to reach Germany via an airplane 
that had no layovers in any “safe third state,” he or she would not have been eligible 
for asylum. Because Bosnia’s largest airport, Sarajevo International Airport, was put 
under the control of Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA) at the start of the war, nearly all 
regularly scheduled flights were interrupted. Although, the airport was later turned 
over to the UN to serve as a humanitarian base, it would have been exceedingly 
difficult for fleeing Bosnians to book themselves on a direct flight to Germany, as the 
airport was used for military and humanitarian purposes only.155 As a result, many 
refugees left Bosnian via rail or bus, and – due to the geographical circumstances – 
had to drive through “safe third states” in order to reach Germany. 
Perhaps the most ironic aspect of Germany’s amendment to restrict asylum 
applications is that the government used various international refugee laws, 
including the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, in order to justify doing so. Because 
nearly half of the 700,000 Bosnians who had fled their homeland for the safety of 
154 Ibid, 162. 
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other European countries attempted to seek asylum in Germany, the German 
government sited the provision of the 1951 Convention that called for refugees to be 
distributed equally amongst regional signatories. Additionally, by claiming that 
Germany was not actually the “country of first refuge” for most, if not all, Bosnian 
refugees (since most passed through a “safe third state” en route to Germany), the 
government was able to avoid violating the non-refoulement clause of the 1951 
Convention. Although this Amendment caused a steep drop in asylum applications 
in Germany, many of the countries bordering Germany, including those that had 
been categorized as “safe third states,” saw a sharp increase in asylum 
applications.156 However, it worth noting that in practice, the ramifications of 
Amendment 16a(2) were as severe as the rhetoric would suggest. In a considerable 
number of instances, Germany was not able to enforce the “safe third state” clause 
because many of those countries refused to readmit asylum seekers, “either due to a 
lack of proof that the applicant had entered German territory from that safe country 
or because the applicant could not meet formal requirements, such as time limits for 
filing a readmission request.”157 In such cases when the third state refused 
admission to refugees, Germany granted them entry in order to prevent refugees 
from becoming stateless.158 
The content and implications Amendment 16a(2) were hotly debated both in 
the governmental, public, and private spheres. It was not until May 15, 1996 – 
nearly three years after the Amendment was approved by the Bundestag and 
156 Hailbronner, “Asylum Law Reform,” 167. 
157 Ibid. 
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Bundesrat – that Germany’s highest Constitutional Court issued a ruling that upheld 
the new asylum law and regulations.159 The Court suggested that the new law 
“created a basis for European countries to try to spread the refugee burden.”160 
Despite the fact that the government was making it increasingly difficult for Bosnian 
refugees to be granted asylum on a large scale, refugees whose applications had 
already been accepted received a variety of benefits in keeping with the stipulations 
of the 1951 Convention. These included “a temporary residence permit, the same 
status as Germans within the social insurance system, social welfare, child benefits, 
child-raising benefits, integration allowances and language courses as well as other 
forms of integration assistance.”161  
It must also be said that while increased restrictions on asylum applications 
prohibited many Bosnian refugees from settling in Germany, there were other 
methods for refugees to legally gain access to the country. This alternative came in 
the form of possessing an entry visa, which Bosnians could obtain by having a 
German individual or organization sponsor them. As the fighting in Bosnia 
intensified in the spring of 1992, millions of Germans became aware of and sensitive 
to the horrors that many refugees were facing in their home country. As a result, 
relatives, charitable organizations, friends of refugees, and church organizations 
made efforts to vouch financial responsibility for various refugees who wanted to 
159 Walker, German and Bosnian Voices, 4. 
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come to Germany so that they would be granted the necessary entry visa.162 This 
shows that although the German government was greatly restricting the channels 
through which refugees could claim asylum, this did not necessarily translate to a 
complete closing of Germany’s border to refugees. Such a reality is demonstrative of 
the fact that very rarely is legislation the only factor in determining how reality 
plays out. Although the law may seem quite black and white when analyzed how it 
appears on paper, this analysis does not take into account all that can occur outside 
the small sphere of policy making and how those occurrences will influence written 
policy and law.  
 
The Gray Area – Policy and Citizens in Action 
 
Thus, the narrative of restrictive asylum policies is not always indicative of 
the lived realities of Bosnian refugees or their experiences with integration. From 
1992-1995, millions of ordinary German citizens mobilized to come to the aid of 
refugees, and helped to ease their transition into German society outside of efforts 
originating with the government. William Walker provides many personal stories 
that corroborate this point in this his book “German and Bosnian Voices in a Time of 
Crisis.” In one of these anecdotes, Walker tells of a German housewife named Maria 
Hurich, who was doing volunteer work with Caritas – a humanitarian aid and 
charity organization of the Catholic Church – in her hometown of Steinenberg in the 
south German state of Baden-Wurttemberg.  When Frau Hurich was assigned to 
162 Walker, German and Bosnian Voices, 5. 
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deliver goods to the Bosnian Croat Cakaric family, she felt a connection to them, and 
sympathetic to their plight. The family had fled their home in Bosnia in 1992, and 
was living in a one room flat with five family members – a father, a mother, and their 
three children. Frau Hurich “decided to adopt the refugee family,” and assisted them 
with registering with the local authorities to ensure the young family received the 
government benefits to which they were entitled.163 Because no one in the family 
spoke any German so shortly after arriving in the country, Frau Hurich escorted the 
family wherever they needed to go. She saw to it that the children were enrolled in 
the neighborhood school, helped the father find a job, and provided support for the 
mother on a daily basis. Frau Hurich devotion to the Cakaric family caused Mr. 
Cakaric to proclaim, “In our house first comes God, then comes Frau Hurich.”164 
Although there are dozens (if not hundreds or thousands) of stories like this 
one that attest to positive experiences of Bosnian refugees in Germany, they are 
unfortunately not reflective of the experience of the majority. In fact, it can be 
argued that no attempts were made to integrate Bosnian refugees into German 
society at all, since supporting refugees on a long-term basis and providing them 
with the resources to permanently establish new lives were never the goals of the 
German government. Dr. Hans-Peter Friedrich, member of the German Bundestag 
and Federal Minister of the Interior, stated in a report that the purpose of admitting 
over 345,000 Bosnian refugees was to grant them temporary protection, “which 
163 Ibid, 31. 
164 Ibid, 33. 
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serves primarily to handle a situation of mass flight or major influx of refugees from 
war or civil war.”165  
Understanding this goal helps to put into context Germany’s decision to 
repatriate hundreds of thousands of Bosnians following the signing of the Dayton 
Accords in 1995, which effectively ended the fighting in Bosnia. Rather than 
determine refugee status solely in accordance with the criteria laid out in the 1951 
Convention, Germany elected to institute the “safe third state” policy to help offset 
some of the obligations it would otherwise have had to follow, e.g. officially granting 
asylum versus having the option of granting temporary protection status. Most 
importantly, temporary protection status legally permitted Germany to undertake a 
program of repatriation without violating non-refoulement principles once the 
immediate danger of persecution had passed in Bosnia.166 
 This specific course of action allowed Germany to operate within the 
framework of the international refugee agreements to which it was (and still is) a 
signatory while still accommodating contemporary domestic political interest. 
Simon Bagshaw, a senior policy advisor at the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, suggests in his article “Benchmarks or 
Deutschmarks?” that granting the Bosnian refugees temporary protection to bypass 
normal asylum procedures, which were often perceived as measures that “over-
165German Federal Ministry of the Interior, "Migration and Integration: Residence 
law and policy on migration and integration in Germany." Last modified October 
2011. 
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burdened” the welfare system. In a period of “economic uncertainty and political 
sensitivity,” the German interior ministers were reluctant to create the image that 
Germany was being  “overwhelmed” by refugees.167 From 1992 to 1997, the German 
government spent an estimated $3 billion annually in services for Bosnian 
refugees.168 At a time in which Germany’s reunification was still only a few years in 
the past, the interior ministers of the German states had major concerns about the 
security problems that an influx of refugees and asylum seekers posed.  
The Interior Minister of North Rhine – Westphalia from 1987-2003, 
Wolfgang Riotte, recalled the pressures that the ministers were under when 
confronted with the refugee populations that were amassing near German borders. 
He reported that, “in 1989-1990 (after the collapse of the Iron Curtain), nearly a 
million people came to West Germany, then the Bundesrepublik.”169 Riotte says, 
“These were people who came from East Germany and ethnic Germans who came 
from the Soviet Union.”170 A communiqué from the office of the Chairman of the 
Interior Ministers Conference claimed that this sudden influx “nearly exhausted the 
accommodation and support possibilities of the states and communities [of West 
Germany].”171 This is of particular importance because the vast majority of Bosnian 
refugees elected to settle in locations where they already had friends and family; 
this tended to be in the southern and western German states (which had been under 
167 Bagshaw, “Benchmarks or Deutschmarks?”, 569. 
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West German control throughout the Cold War) and in West Berlin due to the 
extremely restrictive immigration policies of East Germany (coupled with the fact 
that economic opportunities in this part of the Soviet bloc were far less than those 
that existed for workers in West Germany).172 As a result of this decades long 
settlement trend, Bosnian refugees poured into areas of Germany where welfare 
and asylum services were already being maxed out.173 This further limited 
opportunities for integration into larger German society, and is yet another point of 
explanation as to why Bosnian refugees in Germany had such different experiences 
from their fellow displaced countrymen who had sought refuge in Sweden. 
As previously discussed, the interior ministers’ long-term plan (more 
accurately, the plan championed by the interior ministers from the southern, 
conservative states who had taken in the largest amount of refugees) for Bosnian 
refugees had always been an eventual return to Bosnia. This plan was clearly 
outlined in an IMK communiqué, which read, “The Interior Ministers expect that the 
German government will take timely measures to provide for the return of the 
refugees at the conclusion of the peace talks.”174 However, because various 
international laws including the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 
Geneva Conventions had clear-cut stipulations regarding non-refoulement, Germany 
was required to provide refugees with temporary protection until the conclusion of 
the war, and – according to the 1951 Convention – until the point when “the 
172 Walker, German and Bosnian Voices, 50. 
173 Ibid, 51. 
174 Ibid, 48. 
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circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have 
ceased to exist.”175 
 
Refugee Return: A Nation and a State Divided 
 
The inherent problem with this stipulation is that it has been purposefully 
rendered vague, as the determination of the specifics – such as the when, the where, 
and the why – of possible repatriation is left to the discretion of the host state. In 
other words, assessing whether or not it was ‘safe’ for Bosnian refugees to return to 
their homeland was left in the hands of the German interior ministers. The day after 
peace accords were signed in December 1995, an IMK conference was convened. It 
was decided that because the war in Bosnia was officially over, refugees’ temporary 
protection status had expired, and that it was permissible for repatriation efforts to 
begin.176 As the first European state to announce the end of temporary protection 
status for refugees, Germany came under fire from the UNCHR and those who 
believed that the return of refugees should be a coordinated effort amongst all 
states that had served as temporary hosts.177  
In keeping with the hypothesis that the unique circumstances of German 
history have heavily influenced the state’s outlook on refugee inclusivism and 
integration, the condition of Berlin following the conclusion of World War II likely 
played a pivotal role in Germany’s decision to repatriate Bosnian refugees as soon as 
175 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Text of the 1951 
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it was a possibility. By 1945, Berlin had been reduced to a bombed-out shell of its 
former self; industrial and residential areas alike had been repeated targets of Allied 
airstrikes. Although this was a dark period in history for many Germans, residents of 
Berlin prided themselves on the fact that many had remained in the city throughout 
the war, and played a major part in rebuilding it from the ground-up. Many interior 
ministers and other government officials who took a hardline stance on the 
immediate return of refugees had the experience of living in post-war Berlin, and 
explicitly cited this as a reason for their stance on refugee return – both compulsory 
and voluntary.178 
William Walker, in his book “German and Bosnian Voices in Time of Crisis,” 
recounts verbatim an interview he conducted with Jorg Schonbohm, an interior 
senator in Berlin who was known for his hardline stance on refugee return. 
Schonbohm is a retired German Army general and former deputy minister of 
defense who entered politics after a thirty-five year career in uniform. After 
witnessing the resilience of Berliners as a young boy in the wake of the decimation 
caused by the war, Schonbohm’s opinion on citizens’ post-war time obligations had 
been solidified. He stated in his interview, “If the Bosnian War is terminated and 
there are no hostilities anymore, why can’t the refugees go home and rebuild their 
own country and redo the infrastructure and go on living there?”179 
Another dimension of the debate on refugee return was based along political 
lines, with the CDU (the right of center Christian Democratic Party) favoring more 
immediate return of Bosnian refugees and the SPD (left of center Social Democratic 
178 Ibid, 83. 
179 Ibid, 84. 
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Party) favoring more prolonged action. The divide was also prominent along 
geographical lines, with some of the more northern German states, like Schleswig-
Holstein (who received fewer Bosnian refugees) advocating for a more cautionary 
approach and the more southern states, like Bavaria (who received the most 
Bosnian refugees) advocating for immediate action. Although the federal 
government had officially declared Bosnia a “safe” place to expedite the return of 
refugees, some of the more liberal state interior ministers protested that this claim 
was misguided, and maintained that, “the land was destroyed, and armed war 
criminals were still running around freely.”180 In a direct response to interior 
senator Schonbohm’s opinion, it was plainly asserted that the situation in Bosnia 
“was not like in Germany at the end of the Second World War.”181  
The nature of the refugee returns was also hotly debated in the government 
and public spheres. While the BAMF currently claims that “the great majority of 
Bosnian refugees has since left Germany, most of them voluntarily and with help 
from the relevant repatriation programmes” and that “persons who had suffered 
severe trauma” had been granted special exceptions to remain in Germany 
permanently, the accounts of many Bosnians do not reflect this.182 At the beginning 
of the repatriation program in 1996, the German government first tried to 
incentivize return to Bosnia for specific groups of refugees, while granting 
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exceptions for those refugees who were in the midst of receiving medical care, had 
young children in school, or were Bosnian Muslims from the territory of the 
Republika Srpska.183 However, as the repatriation program continued from 1997 
until the early 2000’s, an increasingly large number of refugees reported being 
forcibly repatriated despite belonging to the groups who had been granted initial 
exceptions. This was especially true in the state of Bavaria, where many Bosnians 
had not taken the government up on its offers of incentives to return to Bosnia. It is 
worth noting that the German government, when calculating the number of Bosnian 
refugees who returned to Bosnia “voluntarily”, included the refugees who had been 
compelled to leave Germany after receiving threats of forcible deportation.184 By 
1998, the German government estimated that only 91,000 Bosnian refugees 
remained in the country out of 345,000.185 Today, fewer than 10,000 of these 
refugees remain in Germany, many of them illegally.186 While a small portion of this 
group was granted permanent residency, the majority of them were ordered to 
leave the country.187  
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An Unlikely Coalition?  The Protestant Church and the Media in Defense of Refugees 
 
Among those who came to the defense of Bosnian refugees and their plight 
were the very institutions and individuals responsible for what little integration was 
able to occur in the refugee population. The decisions of the interior ministers to 
repatriate hundreds of thousands of Bosnian refugees caused public outrage, which 
can largely be attributed to the nature of the coverage the German media was 
providing on the issue. Many members of the German press corps, particularly those 
who worked in television, were stationed in Bosnia in order to provide firsthand 
reports on the war. Images of destruction, especially in Sarajevo, were transmitted 
to millions of German television screens. When presented with a realistic picture of 
the situation on the ground in Bosnia, the German public was largely appalled at the 
immediacy of their government’s proposed refugee repatriation program. The 
media was able to keep this issue at the forefront of public consciousness, as the 
major news stations often interviewed interior ministers and other government 
officials who held opposing opinions on refugee repatriation. For example, the 
interior spokesman for the Free Democratic Party regularly made comments 
criticizing Interior Minister Beckstein of Bavaria for not being sympathetic enough 
to the plight of the refugees. Mr. Beckstein would then appear on the same news 
outlets to respond to the comments.188 The general stance of the media as well as 
the public was that it would have been inhumane to send refugees back to such a 
destroyed country. According to William Walker, the sympathy of the German public 
188 Walker, German and Bosnian Voices, 73. 
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“was easy to understand given its tradition of being a nation friendly to guests 
because of the memories of National Socialism.”189 
The media also provided ample coverage of the IMK conferences, and were 
quick to report on (and criticize) the plans of action that the ministers had reached; 
when the public learned of the government’s plan, the ministers were heavily 
criticized amidst an immediate backlash. Germans took to the streets in protest in 
Berlin and Bavaria after learning of the first coerced deportations, in what came to 
be known as the Easter Appeal in March 1997.190 The protestors maintained that 
the government had crossed a line “set by postwar Germany in its obligation to 
human rights”, and demanded that the return process occur more gradually.191 
Many Germans who openly criticized government plans were people who knew 
Bosnian refugee families personally and had provided them with the support and 
resources that the government had not. This included individuals with experiences 
like Frau Hurich (who appeared personally in front of the courts in order to prevent 
the deportation of the Cakaric family) and religious organizations, which had often 
coordinated donation efforts for refugees, as well as provided them with a 
community of support. 
When the forced repatriation program began in Bavaria, Protestant Bishop 
Hermann von Loewenich announced that church communities in the state would be 
taking in refugees who had been seeking asylum in Germany. Bishop von Loewenich 
stated in the English-language German news media outlet, Spiegel that his church 
189 Ibid, 61. 
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“would be standing by refugees who by injustice did not receive asylum and because 
of that have been placed in danger.”192 Because the Bishop acknowledged that 
churches couldn’t possibly provide the same infrastructure for refugees that the 
state could, its scope would have to be quite limited. Von Loewenich wanted to focus 
on “the most difficult cases,” which included refugees who had been traumatized 
and families that had young children in the school system. In the latter case, the 
Bishop stated that young refugee children had been integrated into the German 
school system, and remembered little, if anything about their country of origin.193 
Particularly in Bavaria, there was “a long list of Bosnian families for which 
the church has cared for, given a place to live, had given the children clothes, and 
found the parents work.”194 In short, the Protestant Church had been responsible for 
helping thousands of refugees integrate into German society and giving them the 
assistance they needed to rebuild their lives. Because of this, church leaders had 
large amounts of empathy for the struggles the refugees had experienced, and were 
not willing to allow poorly devised government policy nullify their humanitarian 
efforts. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Due to marked differences in areas such as citizenship history and 
legislation, national histories, and political goals, Bosnian refugees who had fled to 
192 "Vorbild Kanada." Spiegel, February 19, 1996. 
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Germany had fundamentally different experiences than did their compatriots who 
went to Sweden, despite the fact that the two countries are party to the same 
international refugee law agreements. Of course, Germany’s historical tradition of 
extremely restrictive citizenship laws and limitations on who is considered German 
provided a serious roadblock for Bosnian refugees to have a legal future in the 
country. Although some refugees were granted permanent residence after many 
years of struggling for recognition in the face of rejected asylum applications, 
hundreds of thousands of refugees had no choice but to return to Bosnia once 
repatriation programs began. Although German citizenship laws have undergone a 
significant liberalization in the last decade and a half, these policies did not go into 
effect until the refugee crisis had long been over. 
Historical context also played a pivotal role in terms of why refugees in 
Germany did not receive the same support at government institutional levels as the 
refugees in Sweden. In the wake of the Cold War and collapse of the Berlin Wall, 
huge amounts of refugees poured into Germany, putting significant stress on the 
refugee support network. As a result, when the Bosnian War began only two or so 
years later, many of the government’s resources were already tapped out. Although 
Germany was obligated to meet the bare minimum humanitarian standards set by 
international agreements like the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the 
government was able to circumvent any additional obligations by not officially 
accepting the refugees’ applications for asylum. By instituting the “safe third state” 
rule, Germany was able to create a legal loophole that permitted the government to 
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grant Bosnian refugees temporary protection, which left a legitimate legal space to 
institute repatriation programs at the conclusion of the war.  
Despite the fact that Bosnian refugees did not exactly receive a warm 
welcome from the German government, the public was extremely empathetic 
toward the plight of the refugees. Many individuals and charitable organizations 
voluntarily took on the responsibility of trying to integrate refugees as much as 
possible and provide them with the resources and opportunities that the 
government would not. Because of this warm reception by the public, many Bosnian 
refugees recalled their time in Germany fondly, citing the generosity of the people 
within their respective communities.195 This dichotomy proves that the efforts a 
government puts forth to help refugees rebuild are not the only factors to consider 
when examining the treatment and levels of integration among refugee populations. 
Although aid from the public cannot be a perfect substitute for government aid, it 
certainly went a long way in shaping the experiences of Bosnian refugees in 
Germany. 
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Conclusion  
 
In the wake of the disastrous World Wars of the 20th century, many 
countries, including Germany and Sweden, signed on to international agreements 
pertaining to the treatment of refugees in the hopes of preventing large-scale 
humanitarian catastrophes from occurring in future. These agreements included the 
1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the Geneva Convention, and the 1967 
Protocol. In addition to bringing the plight of refugees to the forefront of the 
international conscience, these agreements helped to establish universally observed 
standards in order to ensure that all refugees were entitled to the same basic rights, 
including the right to seek asylum when faced with persecution in their homelands.  
Theoretically, these international agreements should have established 
overarching guidelines around which governments could have crafted their own 
nation’s policies regarding the treatment of refugees. However, it is clear that this is 
not the case amongst the signatory countries, most notably in Sweden and Germany 
during the height of the Bosnian War. This difference thus prompts a tension, even a 
paradox, which is the main subject of this study: If all countries who are party to the 
aforementioned agreements are obligated to follow the same standards of refugee 
treatment, then what accounts for the vastly different refugee experiences with 
regards to integration and inclusivism in Sweden and Germany?  
In order to get to the root causes of this paradox, I categorized my research 
to fit within the framework of these questions: What national attitudes regarding 
citizenship inclusion and exclusion are codified in legislation? What kinds of 
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national institutions, or lack thereof, are there to help facilitate refugee social 
incorporation? How did media representations of Bosnian refugees influence their 
experiences in these countries? These three areas serve as clear points of 
comparison for Germany and Sweden, as nation’s citizenship policies and the 
expansiveness of institutions that foster integration are often reflective of specific 
national histories and state attitudes toward issues surrounding immigration and 
inclusivism. In conjunction with this, media often plays a large role in both shaping 
public opinion and in transmitting general public sentiments. Media can therefore 
be indicative of yet another dimension of the lived experiences of Bosnian refugees 
in both Sweden and Germany.  
When examining these criteria in the context of Bosnian refugees in Sweden, 
the support that refugees received on the governmental level was very much in 
keeping with Sweden’s reputation of an inclusive, humanitarian-focused welfare 
state. Despite these good intentions, social integration policies were not as 
successful once they were implemented. Because of other factors like an economic 
recession and pre-existing housing segregation, Bosnian refugees were not 
presented with as many opportunities to integrate as government officials had once 
hoped. Regardless of the limitations that reality presented to integration policies, 
many refugees reported feeling satisfied with their new lives in Sweden. Although 
policies were not as effective as initially planned, the stability that living in Sweden 
with legal residency status provided coupled with the good intent behind the 
policies helped to make many refugees feel relatively welcome and comfortable. 
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Tens of thousands of Bosnian refugees who fled to Sweden at the beginning of the 
war still remain there today. 
In sharp contrast to Sweden’s generous government policies toward the 
refugees, the Bosnians that fled to Germany had markedly different experiences. In 
the time of the refugee crisis, German citizenship and naturalization laws were still 
extremely restrictive as a result of policies being carried over from century to 
century. While Sweden enjoyed an international reputation of being inclusive of 
people of all races, ethnicities, and backgrounds, Germany was known for tying 
citizenship to ethnic German ancestry. This alone would have made it extremely 
difficult of Bosnians to be included in German society in every sense of the word. In 
addition to restrictive citizenship laws, Germany’s ministries that had been designed 
to provide services to refugees were already inundated in the early 1990’s due to 
the collapse of the Berlin Wall and refugees hailing from the former East Germany 
and the Soviet Union. This situation combined with a contentious political and 
economic atmosphere led Germany to deny the applications of asylum seekers 
(which would have obligated Germany to provide at least the bare minimum of 
services stipulated in the international agreements) in favor of granting the refugees 
temporary protection status.  
Perhaps the one of the biggest explanations as to why Germany’s approach to 
treating the refugees was fundamentally different from Sweden’s was that the long-
term goals of each country were disparate on the most basic level. While Sweden’s 
policies were instituted with the purpose of helping refugees permanently integrate 
into Swedish life, German policies were enacted with the goal of harboring refugees 
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in the country only until it was deemed safe for them to return to Bosnia. While 
there are likely an incalculable amount of reasons as to why these goals came about, 
my research exposed the following disparities: specific national histories in regards 
to citizenship policies were central in providing the framework for contemporary 
polices and legislation; the differences in the nature of the institutions that 
facilitated integration (Sweden’s ministries were very centralized at the federal 
level, while German policies were heavily contingent on local interior ministers, 
whose experiences with refugees depended upon from which state they hailed), 
which played a significant part in determining what the role of the government 
should have been. When examined in these historical and political contexts, 
different outcomes in Germany and Sweden appear less as a paradox, and more as 
products of different national histories and political geographies.  
The role non-governmental forces played in both countries were essential in 
influencing lived experiences of Bosnian refugees. Because of the media coverage of 
the horrors in Bosnia, the Swedish and German publics felt deep empathy for the 
refugees and their plights, and wanted to help them rebuild their lives. Although the 
German public did not have significant support from its government, individual 
citizens and citizen-groups were able to provide some refugees with the resources 
they needed, which caused many Bosnians to hold favorable opinions of Germany, 
despite being repatriated and not having the same legal options to remain in the 
country as did the Bosnian refugees in Sweden. Entities such as churches and the 
clergy were able to mobilize citizens in Germany to help provide the refugees with 
much-needed resources. This is yet another interesting point of departure; in 
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Sweden where governmental institutions were supportive of refugees, there was no 
need for individual citizens to become activists, whereas in Germany, individual 
citizens stepped in where the state institutions withdrew.  
The cases of Bosnian refugees in Sweden and Germany also reveal this 
important takeaway with regards to providing an explanation for the “paradox”– 
although international agreements often provide a general framework for national 
policies toward refugees, state’s respective histories and their respective goals 
appear to play a much larger role in shaping the specifics of these national policies 
than does international law. However, as the world’s legal codes become 
increasingly connected via a network of multinational and extra-national 
institutions, states will have to find ways to reconcile their national histories and 
existing policies with this new international framework.  
While international agreements and standards are generally viewed as a 
positive product of globalization, particularly in the context of universal 
humanitarianism, implementation of these new standards is often at odds with pre-
existing laws and policies. Although cross-national issues require cross-national 
solutions –particularly in the case of refugee flows – it can be quite difficult for 
states to adopt international agreements that are capable of addressing the 
problems that present themselves on the smaller national and regional levels. Of 
course, this also raises questions about which legal codes should be the basis of 
state policy (international or national), and to what degree states are legally 
obligated to change their national laws to reflect newly derived international laws. 
As we have seen with these case studies on refugee inclusion, the tensions 
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surrounding these issues are very much in play, and will likely continue to be 
present in the future when discussing international humanitarian obligations. 
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